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ABSTRACT. We analyze the problem of determining inventory and pricing decisions in a two-period 
retail setting when an opportunity to refine information about uncertain demand is available. The model 
extends the newsvendor problem with pricing by allowing for multiple suppliers, the pooling of 
procurement resources, and more general informational dynamics. One contribution is the solution 
procedure: we show that all decisions (up to seven in ali, including recourse decisions) can be 
determined uniquely as a function of a surrogate first-period decision called the stocking factor. Hence, 
the two-period decision problem with recourse reduces to a search for one .decision variable. A second 
contribution is the policy implications: we find that the cost oflearning is (I) a consequence of 
censored information because, on the margin, learning is free if full information is guaranteed; (2) 
measured in the form of an increased stocking factor; and (3) shared with the consumer in. the form of a 
higher selling price when demand uncertainty is additive. A third contribution is the application of the 
results to three motivating examples: A market research problem in which a product is introduced in a 
test market prior to a widespread launch; a global newsvendor problem in which a seasonal product is 
sold in two different countries with non-overlapping selling seasons; and a minimum-quantity 
commitment problem in which procurement resources for multiple purchases may be pooled. 
I n  O c t o b e r  1 9 9 9 ,  T h e  N e w  Y o r k  T i m e s  r e p o r t e d  t h a t  C o c a - C o l a  C o .  w a s  c o n d u c t i n g  a  f i e l d  t e s t  t o  a d j u s t  
p r i c e s  d y n a m i c a l l y  b a s e d  o n  a n t i c i p a t e d  d e m a n d  p a t t e r n s  a n d  s t o c k  a v a i l a b i l i t y  ( H a y s ,  1 9 9 9 ) .  T h e n ,  i n  
M a y  2 0 0 0 ,  C o c a - C o l a  C o .  i s s u e d  a  p r e s s  r e l e a s e  a n n o u n c i n g  t h e i r  i n t e n t i o n  t o  i n v e s t  $ 1 0 0  m i l l i o n  t o  
l i n k  m o r e  t h a n  a  h a l f - m i l l i o n  v e n d i n g  m a c h i n e s  w o r l d w i d e  t h r o u g h  i n t e l l i g e n t  v e n d i n g  t e c h n o l o g y .  
A c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  p r e s s  r e l e a s e ,  " I n t e l l i g e n t  v e n d i n g  i s  e x p e c t e d  t o  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  i m p r o v e  i n v e n t o r y  
m a n a g e m e n t ,  a n d  d e l i v e r  s u p e r b  s e r v i c e  t o  c u s t o m e r s  a n d  a  q u a l i t y  p u r c h a s e  e x p e r i e n c e  t o  c o n s u m e r s . "  
I n  t i m e ,  C o c a - C o l a  C o .  e x p e c t s  t o  p r o v i d e  c a s h l e s s  v e n d i n g ,  c o u p o n s ,  a n d  I n t e r n e t  b r o w s i n g .  
C o c a - C o l a ' s  i n i t i a t i v e s  i n t o  i n t e l l i g e n t  v e n d i n g  u n d e r s c o r e  t h e  o b s e r v a t i o n  t h a t  i n f o r m a t i o n  a b o u t  o n e  
r e t a i l  m a r k e t  c a n  i m p r o v e  o p e r a t i n g  e f f i c a c y  i n  r e l a t e d  m a r k e t s .  A  n a t u r a l  c o n s e q u e n c e  o f  t h i s  
d e p e n d e n c y  i s  t h a t  a  g o a l  i n  t h e  f i r s t  m a r k e t  i s  t o  i n v e s t  i n  l e a r n i n g  b y  c o n t r o l l i n g  i n v e n t o r y  a n d  p r i c i n g  
d e c i s i o n s ,  e v e n  i f  s u c h  a  g o a l  c o m e s  a t  t h e  e x p e n s e  o f  n o t  m a x i m i z i n g  l o c a l  p r o f i t s .  T h e  i n t u i t i o n  i s  t h a t  
l e a r n i n g  c a n  l e a d  t o  i m p r o v e m e n t s  i n  f u t u r e  m a r k e t s  t h a t  u l t i m a t e l y  p r o d u c e  h i g h e r  s y s t e m - w i d e  p r o f i t s .  
T h e  f o l l o w i n g  t h r e e  i l l u s t r a t i o n s  f u r t h e r  h i g h l i g h t  t h e  n a t u r a l  r o l e  t h a t  i n f o r m a t i o n  g a t h e r e d  i n  o n e  
m a r k e t  c a n  p l a y  t o  e n h a n c e  d e c i s i o n  m a k i n g  i n  a  r e l a t e d  m a r k e t  s e p a r a t e d  i n  t i m e ,  i n  s p a c e ,  o r  i n  b o t h .  
T h e  f i r s t  e x a m p l e  i s  r e m i n i s c e n t  o f  t h e  r e c e n t  m a r k e t  t e s t  b y  F r i t o - L a y ,  I n c .  o f  W O W ! ™ ,  i t s  l i n e  o f  
s n a c k s  m a d e  w i t h  i t s  f a t - f r e e  c o o k i n g  o i l ,  O l e a n ,  b e f o r e  a  n a t i o n a l  l a u n c h  ( F r i t o - L a y ,  I n c . ,  1 9 9 7 ) .  I t  a l s o  
i s  s i m i l a r  t o  m a r k e t  t e s t s  c o n d u c t e d  r e g u l a r l y  b y  r e t a i l e r s  ( L i l i e n  e t  a l . ,  1 9 9 2 ) .  T h e  s e c o n d  e x a m p l e  i s  a  
g e n e r a l i z a t i o n  o f  a  r e c e n t  t w o - p e r i o d  m o d e l  b y  K o u v e l i s  a n d  G u t i e r r e z  ( 1 9 9 7 ) .  A n d  t h e  t h i r d  e x a m p l e  i s  
a n  e x t e n s i o n  o f  a  m u l t i - p e r i o d  d e c i s i o n  p r o b l e m  d u e  t o  B a s s o k  a n d  A n u p i n d i  ( 1 9 9 7 ) .  
E x a n i p l e  1 .  T e s t  M a r k e t  
A  f i r m  i n t r o d u c e s  a  n e w  p r o d u c t  i n  a  t e s t  m a r k e t  p r i o r  t o  a  w i d e s p r e a d  l a u n c h .  B e f o r e  
t h e  s t a r t  o f  t h e  t e s t ,  t h e  f i r m ' s  d e c i s i o n s  i n c l u d e :  ( 1 )  h o w  m u c h  s t 6 c k  t o  s u p p l y  f o r  t h e  
t e s t  m a r k e t  a n d  ( 2 )  w h a t  s e l l i n g  p r i c e  t o  s e t  i n  t h e  t e s t  m a r k e t .  T h e n ,  a f t e r  o b s e r v i n g  
s a l e s  i n  t h e  t e s t  m a r k e t ,  t h e  f i r m  c a n :  ( 3 )  r e f i n e  i t s  e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  m a r k e t  s i z e  
o f  t h e  o v e r a l l  m a r k e t ,  ( 4 )  d e t e n n i n e  h o w  m u c h  s t o c k  t o  s u p p l y  f o r  t h e  o v e r a l l  m a r k e t ,  a n d  
( 5 )  r e a s s e s s  i t s  p r i c i n g  p o l i c y  f o r  t h e  o v e r a l l  m a r k e t .  
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Example 2. Global Newsvendor 
A firm sells a seasonal product with uncertain demand in two countries with non-
overlapping selling seasons. Before the start of the first selling season, the firm's 
decisions include: (1) how much stock to supply to the first country's market, (2) how 
much stock to commit to the second country's market, and (3) what selling price to set in 
the first country's market. Then, after observing sales in the first country's market, the 
firm can: (4) refine its estimate of the potential market size of the second country's 
market, (5) determine how much of any unsold inventory from the first country's market 
to transship to the second country's market, (6) decide how much stock to procure from a 
premium-priced supplier for the second country's market, and (7) set a selling price for 
the second country's market. Note that revenue generated in the second country's market 
will be subject to exchange rate risk. 
Example 3. Supply Contracts with Minimum Quantity Commitment 
A firm commits to a long-term contract specifying a minimum total quantity amount that 
will be purchased over the course of a multi-period selling season. Before the start of the 
first period, the firm's decisions include: (I) how much stock to commit to each period 
of the selling season and (2) the selling price of the product. Then, at the end of each 
period, after observing sales, the firm can: (3) refine its estimate of the potential market 
size for the upcoming period, ( 4) determine how much stock to procure at a premium 
price to supplement its available stock, and (5) adjust its selling price. · 
The goal o( this paper is to develop a modeling framework that captures the essential features of these 
three examples and to use that framework to answer a variety of questions that arise naturally. For 
example: How can optimal pricing and inventory decisions be determined when recourse is available? 
Should price be increased today because there is an opportunity to learn about tomorrow's market? 
Likewise, should inventory investment be increased? To that end, we define a two-period extension to 
the newsvendor problem with pricing by allowing for multiple suppliers and more general informational 
dynamics. The framework is defined by the following sequence of events and decisions: 
Step (la): Before the beginning of period I, determine how much to buy from a supplier for delivery in 
period 1 and in period 2, respectively. This is equivalent to making a commitment to 
purchase a specific amount over the life of a 2-period contract. 
Step (lb ): Also before the beginning of period 1, determine the price at which to sell the product. This 
implies that the firm can affect market demand through its retail selling price. Demand 
uncertainty is introduced in an additive manner, which means that price influences expected 
demand, but not demand variance. We assume that price and demand are inversely related so 
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t h a t  i n c r e a s e s  i n  p r i c e  c o r r e s p o n d  t o  d e c r e a s e s  i n  d e m a n d .  T h u s ,  f o r  a  g i v e n  l e v e l  o f  s t o c k i n g  
q u a n t i t y ,  a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  p r i c e  r e s u l t s  i n  a  l o w e r  l i k e l i h o o d  o f  s t o c k - o u t s .  
S t e p  ( 2 ) :  O b s e r v e  t h e  s a l e s  i n  p e r i o d  1  a n d  t h e n  e x p l o i t  t h a t  i n f o r m a t i o n  b y  r e f i n i n g  t h e  
c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  o f  t h e  d e m a n d  u n c e r t a i n t y  p r e s c r i b e d  f o r  t h e  s e c o n d  p e r i o d .  W e  a s s u m e  
u n o b s e r v a b l e  l o s t  s a l e s :  I f  t h e r e  i s  i n v e n t o r y  l e f t  o v e r  f r o m  p e r i o d  1 ,  t h e n  s a l e s  c o r r e s p o n d s  
t o  d e m a n d ,  w h i c h  i m p l i e s  t h a t  f u l l  i n f o r m a t i o n  i s  a v a i l a b l e  t o  u p d a t e  d e m a n d  u n c e r t a i n t y  i n  
p e r i o d  2 .  B u t ,  i f  t h e r e  i s  n o  i n v e n t o r y  l e f t  o v e r  f r o m  p e r i o d  1 ,  t h e n  s a l e s  p r o v i d e s  c e n s o r e d  
i n f o r m a t i o n  r e g a r d i n g  d e m a n d ,  w h i c h  i m p l i e s  t h a t  i n c o m p l e t e  i n f o r m a t i o n  i s  a v a i l a b l e  t o  
u p d a t e  d e m a n d  u n c e r t a i n t y  i n  p e r i o d  2 .  R a i s i n g  t h e  s t o c k i n g  q u a n t i t y ,  t h e  s e l l i n g  p r i c e ,  o r  
b o t h  i n  p e r i o d  1  i n c r e a s e s  t h e  l i k e l i h o o d  o f  o b t a i n i n g  f u l l  i n f o r m a t i o n .  
S t e p  ( 3 ) :  G i v e n  t h e  r e f i n e d  e s t i m a t e  f o r  d e m a n d  i n  p e r i o d  2 ,  d e t e r m i n e  t h e  s t o c k i n g  q u a n t i t y  a n d  
s e l l i n g  p r i c e  f o r  p e r i o d  2 .  N o t e  t h a t  t h e  s t o c k i n g  q u a n t i t y  d e c i s i o n  w a s  m a d e  t e n t a t i v e l y  a t  
t h e  b e g i n n i n g  o f  p e r i o d  1  ( S t e p  1 a ) .  H o w e v e r  t h r e e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  f o r  r e c o u r s e  e x i s t  a t  t h e  
b e g i n n i n g  o f  p e r i o d  2 :  a  p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  o r i g i n a l  p r o c u r e m e n t  q u a n t i t y  c a n  b e  d i s c a r d e d  r a t h e r  
t h a n  s t o c k e d  f o r  r e t a i l  s a l e ,  s o m e  o r  a l l  o f  a n y  i n v e n t o r y  l e f t  o v e r  f r o m  p e r i o d  1  c a n  b e  h e l d  
f o r  ( o r  t r a n s f e r r e d  t o )  p e r i o d  2 ,  a n d  s u p p l e m e n t a l  s t o c k  c a n  b e  p u r c h a s e d  a t  a  p r e m i u m  p r i c e .  
N o t e  a l s o  t h a t  i f  t h e  s e c o n d  m a r k e t  i s  f o r e i g n ,  t h e n  t h e  u n i t  r e v e n u e  i n  t e r m s  o f  t h e  h o m e  
c u r r e n c y  i s  u n c e r t a i n  b e c a u s e  o f  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  f l u c t u a t i o n s .  
T h e  t i m i n g  o f  t h e s e  e v e n t s  n a t u r a l l y  l e a d s  t o  t h e  f o r m u l a t i o n  o f  t h e  d e c i s i o n  p r o b l e m  a s  a  t w o - s t a g e  
s t o c h a s t i c  p r o g r a m  w i t h  r e c o u r s e  ( w h e r e  e a c h  t i m e  p e r i o d  o f  o u r  m o d e l  c o n s t i t u t e s  a  " s t a g e " ) .  I n  o u r  
m o d e l ,  S t e p s  1 a  a n d  1 b  c o r r e s p o n d  t o  t h e  f i r s t  s t a g e ,  S t e p  3  c o r r e s p o n d s  t o  t h e  s e c o n d  s t a g e ,  a n d  S t e p  2  
p r o v i d e s  i n f o r m a t i o n  t h a t  l i n k s  t h e  t w o  s t a g e s .  O u r  m o d e l  m a k e s  a  c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  i n  
s e v e r a l  w a y s .  F i r s t ,  w e  e x t e n d  t h e  n e w s v e n d o r  p r o b l e m  w i t h  p r i c i n g  b y  i n c o r p o r a t i n g  m o r e  g e n e r a l  
i n f o r m a t i o n a l  d y n a m i c s  a n d ,  i n  e f f e c t ,  m u l t i p l e  s u p p l i e r s .  S e c o n d ,  w e  i n c o r p o r a t e  r e t a i l  p r i c i n g  a n d  
i n f o r m a t i o n a l  d y n a m i c s  i n t o  t h e  g l o b a l  n e w s v e n d o r  p r o b l e m  o f  K o u v e l i s  a n d  G u t i e r r e z  ( 1 9 9 7 )  a n d  i n t o  
t h e  m i n i m u m  q u a n t i t y  c o m m i t m e n t  m o d e l  o f  B a s s o k  a n d  A n u p i n d i  (1997~. F i n a l l y ,  b y  i n c o r p o r a t i n g  
a s p e c t s  o f  m a r k e t i n g ,  e c o n o m i c s ,  a n d  f i n a n c e ,  w e  s h o w  h o w  a n  i n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y  a p p r o a c h  t o  t r a d i t i o n a l  
o p e r a t i o n s  m a n a g e m e n t  p r o b l e m s  c a n  i m p r o v e  t h e  q u a l i t y  o f  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g .  
T h e  r e m a i n d e r  o f  t h i s  p a p e r  i s  o r g a n i z e d  a s  f o l l o w s .  S e c t i o n  1  p o s i t i o n s  t h i s  p a p e r  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  
e x i s t i n g  l i t e r a t u r e .  T h e n ,  i n  S e c t i o n  2 ,  w e  d e v e l o p  t h e  f o r m a l  m a t h e m a t i c a l  m o d e l .  I n  a n a l y z i n g  t h e  
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model, we follow a standard approach of working backwards: First we solve the recourse problem as 
though all relevant input parameters have already been updated based on the first period's decisions and 
observations (Section 3); then we identify mechanisms for using information 'Obtained from the first 
period to update the input parameters used in the recourse problem (Section 4); and finally, exploiting 
the foresight of how parameters will be updated and the recourse problem solved based on the events of 
period I, we solve the first-stage decision problem and examine the benefits of linking related markets 
together rather than treating them as being independent (Section 5). The results of our analysis will 
show that this complex problem with up to seven decision variables reduces to a search for one decision: 
the optimal stocking factor (which we define in Section 2) for the first period. Moreover, our results 
will indicate that much of the insight regarding the impact that transferring information and inventory 
between retail markets has on operational decision making can be explained within the context of the 
optimal stocking factor. We discuss the applicability and scope of our results in Section 6. 
1 RELATIONSlllPTOTHELITERATURE 
The model developed in this paper spans several streams of literature. One such stream is the literature 
on the price-setting newsvendor problem. Petruzzi and Dada (1999a) provide an integrative review of 
this problem; however it can be described succinctly as follows: given economic parameters and a 
distribution function to characterize demand, a stocking quantity and a selling price must be determined 
before the price-dependent, uncertain demand for a single period is realized. Although this construct is 
fundamental to our recourse problem, the analysis developed here is more general. In effect, the 
recourse problem analyzed in this paper can be thought of as a multiple-supplier, price-setting 
newsvendor problem because the stocking quantity made available for the second stage of our two-stage 
problem originates from as many as three available sources: the amount of stock committed to prior to 
the beginning of the fust period represents the frrst source; the random amount of stock left over from 
the fust period represents the second source; and the amount that can be ordered at a price premium 
represents the third source. 
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F r o m  t h e  p e r s p e c t i v e  o f  a  m a n a g e r  a b o u t  t o  m a k e  t h e  r e c o u r s e  d e c i s i o n s ,  t h e  p e r - u n i t  " p u r c h a s e "  c o s t  
a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  t h e  f i r s t  s o u r c e  i s  z e r o  b e c a u s e  t h e  i n v e s t m e n t  i n  t h i s  s t o c k  i s  s u n k ,  c o m m i t t e d  t o  a  
p e r i o d  e a r l i e r .  H o w e v e r ,  t h e  s u p p l y  o f  t h i s  s t o c k  i s  . c o n s t r a i n e d ,  l i m i t e d  t o  t h e  d e c i s i o n  m a d e  a  p e r i o d  
e a r l i e r .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t o  t h i s  m a n a g e r ,  t h e  p e r - u n i t  p u r c h a s e  c o s t  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  t h e .  s e c o n d  s o u r c e  i s  t h e  
c o s t  o f  t r a n s s h i p p i n g  a  u n i t  o f  s t o c k  f r o m  m a r k e t  1  t o  m a r k e t  2 ,  i f  a p p l i c a b l e .  T h e  s u p p l y  o f  t h i s  s t o c k  
· a l s o  i s  l i m i t e d ,  c o n s t r a i n e d  b y  t h e  r e a l i z e d  v a l u e  o f  t h e  r a n d o m  n u m b e r  o f  l e f t o v e r s  r e s u l t i n g  f r o m  t h e  
f i r s t  p e r i o d ' s  o p e r a t i o n s .  W e  a s s u m e  t h a t  t h e  s u p p l y  o f  s t o c k  a v a i l a b l e  a t  a  p r i c e  p r e m i u m  i s  u n l i m i t e d ;  
h o w e v e r ,  p r e s u m a b l y ,  t h e  p e r - u n i t  p u r c h a s e  c o s t  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  i t  i s  s t r i c t l y  . g r e a t e r  t h a n  t h e  
c o r r e s p o n d i n g  c o s t  o f  e i t h e r  o f  t h e  o t h e r  t w o  s u p p l y  s o u r c e s .  
A  s e c o n d  s t r e a m  o f  l i t e r a t u r e  i s  t h a t  o n  d y n a m i c  i n v e n t o r y  m o d e l s  w i t h  p r i c i n g  a n d  s t o c h a s t i c  d e m a n d .  
A s  i n  E r n s t  ( 1 9 7 0 ) ,  Z a b e l  ( 1 9 7 2 ) ,  A l p e r n  a n d  S n o w e r  ( 1 9 8 8 ) ,  T h o w s e n  ( 1 9 7 5 ) ,  a n d  P e t r u z z i  a n d  D a d a  
( 1 9 9 9 b  ) ,  l e f t o v e r  i n v e n t o r y  i s  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  s a l e  i n  s u b s e q u e n t  p e r i o d s ,  b u t  d e m a n d  i n  e x c e s s  o f  s u p p l y  i s  
l o s t .  H o w e v e r ,  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n a l  d y n a m i c s  i n  o u r  t w o - p e r i o d  m o d e l  a r e  m o r e  g e n e r a l .  W e  e x p l i c i t l y  
i n c o r p o r a t e  m e c h a n i s m s  f o r  r e f i n i n g  t h e  c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  o f  d e m a n d  u n c e r t a i n t y  b a s e d  o n  t h e  
o b s e r v a t i o n  o f  p r e v i o u s  s a l e s .  N e i t h e r  E r n s t ,  Z a b e l ,  n o r  T h o w s e n  i n c o r p o r a t e  u p d a t i n g  p r o c e d u r e s  i n  h i s  
m o d e l ;  a n d ,  A l p e r n  a n d  S n o w e r  a n d  P e t r u z z i  a n d  D a d a  e a c h  i n v e s t i g a t e  a  v a r i a n t  o f  a  m o r e  s p e c i f i c  c a s e  
i n  w h i c h  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  e x i s t s  t o  r e s o l v e  u n c e r t a i n t y  c o m p l e t e l y .  
A  t h i r d  s t r e a m  o f  l i t e r a t u r e  i s  t h a t  o n  s t o c h a s t i c  i n v e n t o r y  t h e o r y  w i t h  u n o b s e r v a b l e  l o s t  s a l e s .  R e c a l l ,  
s t e p  2  i n  o u r  m o d e l  c a l l s  f o r  t h e  r e f i n e m e n t  o f  t h e  s e c o n d - p e r i o d  d e m a n d  d i s t r i b u t i o n  b a s e d  o n  t h e  
o b s e r v a t i o n  o f  f i r s t - p e r i o d  s a l e s .  T h i s  m o d e l i n g  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  l e a d s  t o  c e n s o r e d  i n f o r m a t i o n  b e c a u s e ,  
g e n e r a l l y  s p e a k i n g ,  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  s a l e s  i n  a n y  g i v e n  p e r i o d  c a n n o t  e x c e e d  t h e  s m a l l e r  o f  d e m a n d  a n d  
s u p p l y  f o r  t h e  p e r i o d .  A s  a  r e s u l t ,  t h e  o b s e r v a t i o n  o f  s a l e s  i n  a  s t o c k - o u t  s i t u a t i o n  p r o v i d e s  o n l y  a  l o w e r ·  
b o u n d  f o r  t h e  a c t u a l  d e m a n d  t h a t  o c c u r s .  T o  a v o i d  c e n s o r e d  d e m a n d  i n f o r m a t i o n ,  b o t h  s a l e s  a n d  
s h o r t a g e s  m u s t  b e  r e c o r d e d ;  b u t ,  i n  m a n y  c a s e s ,  t h e  o b s e r v a t i o n  a n d  r e c o r d i n g  o f  e a c h  o c c u r r e n c e  o f  
u n f i l l e d  d e m a n d  s i m p l y  i s  n o t  p r a c t i c a l .  
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Relevant papers appearing either in the operations management or the economics literature address only 
aspects of the learning model employed in this paper. In particular, Lariviere and Porteus (1999); 
Krouse and Senchack (1977); Harpaz et al. (1982); Braden and Freimer (1991); Nahmias (1993); and 
Agrawal and Smith (1996) incorporate the idea of learning from censored information into inventory 
models, but they assume that the selling price is given rather than incorporate it as a decision variable. 
On the other hand, Grossman et al. (1977); Lazear (1986); Balvers and Cosimano (1990); Trefler 
(1993); and Braden and Oren (1994) develop economic models for learning the demand curve, but they 
assume that the stocking quantity is given rather than incorporate it as a decision variable. 
A fourth stream of literature is that on procurement models with recourse. This literature has become 
vast in recent years, thanks to the explosive interest in supply chain management. We provide only 
representative samples of related models here and refer the reader to Tayur, Ganeshan, and Magazine 
(1999) for a more comprehensive treatment. Briefly stated, models of this type investigate 
postponement strategies in which a buyer retains procurement flexibility by placing a tentative order 
with a supplier only to adjust that order at a later time once more accurate market information becomes 
available. Academic interest typically is in the development of contract parameters defining the degree 
of flexibiiity afforded to the buyer and in the "price" of flexibility; that is, in the form and amount of 
compensation provided by the buyer to the supplier in exchange for the flexibility to the adjust the 
procurement amount. Common subject headings appearing in this literature include accurate response 
(e.g., Fisher and Raman, 1996); backup agreements (e.g., Eppen and Iyer, 1997); buyback or returns 
policies (e.g., Emmons and Gilbert, 1998); minimum quantity commitments (e.g., Bassok and Anupindi, 
1997); quantity flexibility (e.g., Tsay and Lovejoy, 1999); quick response (lyer and Bergen, 1997); and 
global sourcing (Kouvelis and Gutierrez, 1997). 
Kouvelis and Gutierrez (1997) were particularly influential in the development of our model. They 
develop a profit-maximizing strategy for an international firm that sells a fashion good in two, non-
overlapping markets. In their model, Kouvelis and Gutierrez incorporate foreign exchange risk and 
provide the alternative of transferring to the second market some portion of the leftovers remaining from 
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t h e  f i r s t  m a r k e t ;  h o w e v e r ,  t h e y  a s s u m e  t h a t  t h e  s e l l i n g  p r i c e  f o r  e a c h  m a r k e t  i s  g i v e n  a n d  t h a t  t h e  
d e m a n d  d i s t r i b u t i o n  i s  n o t  u p d a t e d  b e t w e e n  p e r i o d s .  K o u v e l i s  a n d  G u t i e r r e z  f o c u s  p r i m a r i l y  o n  
d e v i s i n g  a  w h o l e s a l e  p r i c i n g  s c h e m e  f o r  t h e  t r a n s f e r  o f  i n v e n t o r y  b e t w e e n  t h e  t w o  m a r k e t s  s o  a s  t o  f i n d  
a n  e f f i c i e n t  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  p r o f i t  b e t w e e n  t h e  p l a y e r s  p a r t i c i p a t i n g  i n  t h e  t w o  m a r k e t s .  W e  f o c u s  i n s t e a d  
o n  a  r e t a i l  p r i c i n g  s c h e m e  f o r  t h e  t r a n s f e r  o f  i n f o n n a t i o n  b e t w e e n  t h e  t w o  m a r k e t s  s o  a s  t o  o p t i m i z e  t h e  
c o o r d i n a t e d  p r o f i t  g e n e r a t e d  b y  t h e  t w o  m a r k e t s  c o m b i n e d .  
2  F O R M U L A T I O N  O F  T i l E  T w o - P E R I O D  S T O C H A S T I C  P R O G R A M  
C o n s i d e r  a  s i n g l e  f i r m  t h a t  o p e r a t e s  i n  t w o  r e t a i l  m a r k e t s .  T h e  f i r m  o f f e r s  t h e  s a m e  p r o d u c t  f o r  s a l e  i n  
b o t h  m a r k e t s ,  b u t  t h e  s e l l i n g  s e a s o n s  a r e  n o n - o v e r l a p p i n g .  C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  t h e  f i r m  c a n  t r a n s f e r  s o m e  o r  
a l l  o f  t h e  l e f t o v e r s  r e m a i n i n g  f r o m  t h e  f i r s t  m a r k e t  t o  t h e  s e c o n d  m a r k e t  f o r  p o s s i b l e  s a l e  i n  t h e  s e c o n d  
s e l l i n g  s e a s o n .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  r e s p e c t i v e  m a r k e t  d e m a n d  f u n c t i o n s ,  e a c h  o f  w h i c h  a r e  s t o c h a s t i c ,  p r i c e  
d e p e n d e n t ,  a n d  i n c l u d e  a n  u n c e r t a i n  i n t e r c e p t  t e r m ,  a r e  r e l a t e d  d u e  t o  h o m o g e n o u s  c u s t o m e r  
p r e f e r e n c e s .  A s  a  r e s u l t ,  t h e  f i r m  c a n  r e v i s e  i t s  c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  o f  t h e  u n k n o w n  d e m a n d  p a r a m e t e r  
a p p l i c a b l e  t o  t h e  s e c o n d  m a r k e t  b y  g a t h e r i n g  i n f o r m a t i o n  a b o u t  d e m a n d  i n  t h e  f i r s t  m a r k e t  a n d  t h e n  
t r a n s f e r r i n g  t h a t  i n f o r m a t i o n  t o  t h e  s e c o n d  m a r k e t  T h e  f i r m ' s  o b j e c t i v e  i s  t o  m a x i m i z e  t h e  t o t a l  
e x p e c t e d  p r o f i t  g e n e r a t e d  b y  t h e  t w o  m a r k e t s ;  i t ' s  c o n t r o l s  a r e  t h e  s t o c k i n g  q u a n t i t y  a n d  t h e  r e t a i l  s e l l i n g  
p r i c e  f o r  e a c h  o f  t h e  t w o  m a r k e t s .  
W e  d e f i n e  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  b a s i c  n o t a t i o n  f o r  o u r  m o d e l :  
i  =  1 , 2 :  
Q :  
i n d e x  i d e n t i f y i n g  t h e  f i r s t  a n d  s e c o n d  r e t a i l  m a r k e t s ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y ;  o r  e q u i v a l e n t l y ,  i n d e x  
i d e n t i f y i n g  t h e  f i r s t  a n d  s e c o n d  s e l l i n g  p e r i o d s ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  
p e r - u n i t  s e l l i n g  p r i c e  o f  s t o c k  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  r e t a i l  s a l e  i n  m a r k e t  i .  
q u a n t i t y  o r d e r e d  a t  t h e  b e g i n n i n g  o f  p e r i o d  I  ( f r o m  a n  o u t s i d e  s u p p l i e r ) ,  b u t  n o t  r e c e i v e d  
u n t i l  t h e  b e g i n n i n g  o f  p e r i o d  2 .  
·  a m o u n t  o f  Q  t h a t  i s  s t o c k e d  f o r  r e t a i l  s a l e  i n  m a r k e t  2  (  q
1  
r e p r e s e n t s  a  r e c o u r s e  d e c i s i o n ;  
q
1  
<  Q  i n d i c a t e s  a  r e c o u r s e  d e c i s i o n  t o  d i s c a r d  Q - q
1  
u n i t s  r a t h e r  t h a n  t o  m a k e  t h e m  
a v a i l a b l e  f o r  r e t a i l  s a l e  i n  m a r k e t  2 ) .  
q u a n t i t y  r e m a i n i n g  a t  t h e  e n d  o f  p e r i o d  I  ( f r o m  o p e r a t i o n s  i n  m a r k e t  I )  t h a t  i s  c a r r i e d  i n t o  
p e r i o d  2  a n d  s t o c k e d  f o r  r e t a i l  s a l e  i n  m a r k e t  2 .  
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q2: quantity purchased (from an outside supplier) at the beginning of period 2 that is stocked 
for retail sale in market 2. 
Si: stocking quantity made available for retail sale in market i (S1 is ordered and purchased 
from an outside supplier at the beginning of period I; S2,;, q1 + q12 + q2). 
Ci: per-unit purchase cost associated with stock ordered at the beginning of period i. 
c12: per-unit transshipment cost associated with transferring stock left over from market I to 
market 2 (applies only if markets are separated in space as, for example, in the global 
newsvendor problem). 
hi: per-unit holding cost attributed to inventory left over in period i. 
Ei: random variable representing the uncertainty associated with the demand function 
corresponding to market i. 
D(pbEi): uncertain, price-dependent demand function corresponding to market i. 
1-i: number of leftovers from market i (Li = max { Si - D(pbEi), 0) ). 
£: realized number of leftovers from market I; this establishes the maximum amount of 
inventory that can be transferred from market I to market 2. 
t: sufficient statistic representing information obtained during the first selling season and 
used to update the characterization of e2; this information is deduced from f. 
!lh J.t2(t): expected value of e1 and E2 (given the information t), respectively. 
F1(.), F2(.Jt): distribution function associated with e1 and E2 (given the information t), respectively. 
f1(.), f2(.Jt): density function associated with E1 and E2 (given the information t),respectively. 
We assume that the firm commits to procurement quantities for both markets at the beginning of the first 
selling season, although additional units can be procured for the second market at the beginning of 
period 2, if necessary. We do not require that the firm receive both its procurement quantities ordered at 
the beginning of the first selling season, only that it establish at that time a contractual arrangement 
governing the specified amount to be delivered at the start of each selling season. One motivation for 
this restriction is the desire to establish a modeling framework for a firm that negotiates a cost discount 
schedule by bringing larger procurement quantities to the bargaining tab!~. Correspondingly, we 
assume c1 < c2, regardless of whether units purchased for c2 are procured from the same supplier as the 
units purchased for c1 or from a separate supplier altogether. Moreover, we assume that c12 < c2 because 
otherwise, it would not be economically sensible to transfer any leftovers from market I to market 2. 
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We assume no penalty cost for a lost sale other than forfeited profit. That is, we let the per-unit· 
goodwill cost of a shortage equal zero. We justify this assumption in two ways. First, each of the two 
markets has only one selling season; consequently, goodwill cost has little meaning. Second, the firm is 
a price-setter. This means that the firm affects demand by changing its selling price. Therefore, the lost 
goodwill resulting in an unsatisfied demand can be thought of within the context of the parameters of 
the demand function. Note, however, a per-unit cost of goodwill can be included explicitly in the model 
without changing the structure of the results. Similarly, we assume that the cost of discarding a unit is 
zero and that there is no salvage value. Again, either a per-unit discarding cost or a per-unit salvage 
value can be included without difficulty. 
We characterize demand for each market as a decreasing linear function of Pi and include the unknown 
parameter, Ei, as an additive term: D(pi,Ei) = ai ~ biPi + Ei. We assume that Ei > 0. Moreover, we assume 
that £1 and £2 are related such that the information transferred from the first selling season to the second 
selling season can be obtained by observing the number of leftovers occurring in market 1. In 
particular: If leftovers remain at the end of the first selling season (i.e., if L1 = S1- D(pi>E1) > O),.then 
market 1 sales equals market 1 demand, which implies that the realized value of £1 can be deduced: £1 = 
S1 - a1 + b1P1 - L1. In this case, the realized value of £1 represents the information obtained during the 
first selling season (i.e., if the realized value of £1 can be deduced, then t = EJ). This information then 
can be used to update the demand distribution for market 2: F2(.jt) = Fz(.jEJ). If no leftovers remain at 
the end of the first selling season (i.e., if L1 = 0), then market 1 sales does not equal market 1 demand, 
which implies that the realized value of £1 cannot be deduced. However, a lower bound for E~o which we 
denote as zh can be deduced: z1 = S1- a1 + b1p1. In this case, the lower bound for £1 represents the 
information obtained during the first selling season (i.e., if the realized value of £1 cannot be deduced, 
then t = z~o where z1 provides a lower bound for £1). This information then can be used to update the 
demand distribution for market 2: Fz(.jt) = F2(.jz1). We introduce a specific technique for using tto 
derive F2(.jt) in Section 4. 
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Regardless of the events occurring during the first selling season, the decisions that are made at the 
beginning of the second selling season are made in the presence of uncertainty. However, because e2 is 
related to Et. the characterization of that uncertainty can be honed by using information revealed during 
the first selling season. Such information comes in one of two possible forms, depending on whether or 
not leftovers remain at the conclusion of the first selling season: If leftovers remain, then t = Et. which 
represents an example of full (or complete) information being transferred from market 1 to market 2. If 
leftovers do not remain, then t = z1 represents an example of censored information being transferred 
from market 1 to market 2. We refer to the quantity, Z;, defined in general as Z; = Si - ai + biPh as the 
stocking factor associated with selling season i (Petruzzi and Dada, 1999a). It is a convenient measure 
because a simple comparison between Z; and Ei yields the number of leftovers in selling season i: ~ = 
max{zi- Ei. 0}. 
Next, we present our model formally. Let: 
1t = maximum expected profit associated with the two-period problem. 
Il(Q,z1Jt) = maximum expected profit associated with the recourse problem when Q is the 
procurement quantity for market 2 committed to prior to the first selling season, z1 is the 
stocking factor associated with market 1, and tis the information obtained during the first 
selling season. 
At the beginning of the first selling season, Q units are ordered for delivery at the beginning of the 
second selling season at a cost of c1 each. Although these units are not available for sale in market 1 
and, perhaps, are not paid for until the beginning of the second selling season, the decision must be 
made at the beginning of the first season. Thus, we account for their cost in period 1. Also at the 
beginning of the first selling season, 81 units are purchased at a cost of c1 each. These units are stocked 
for sale in market 1. Each unit sold in market 1 generates a revenue of PI. and each unit left over creates 
a holding cost of h1. Then, at the beginning of the second selling season, 82 units are stocked for sale in 
market 2. Of the Sz units stocked, q1 units are acquired at no additional marginal cost (the "purchase" 
cost associated with q1 is zero because the investment in this stock is sunk, committed to a period 
earlier), but q1 is restricted by Q, the quantity ordered one period earlier; q12 units are acquired for a 
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m a r g i n a l  c o s t  o f  c
1 2  
e a c h ,  b u t  q
1 2  
i s  r e s t r i c t e d  b y L 1  =  m a x { z 1 - E~oO}, t h e  r a n d o m  n u m b e r  o f l e f t o v e r s  
r e m a i n i n g  a t  t h e  e n d  o f  t h e  f i r s t  s e l l i n g  s e a s o n ;  a n d  q z  u n i t s  a r e  p u r c h a s e d  f o r  a  m a r g i n a l  c o s t  o f  C z  e a c h  
( t h e r e  i s  n o  c a p a c i t y  l i m i t a t i o n  f o r  q
2
) .  E a c h  u n i t  s o l d  i n  m a r k e t  2  g e n e r a t e s  a  r e v e n u e  o f  p z  a n d  e a c h  
u n i t  l e f t  o v e r  c r e a t e s  a  h o l d i n g  c o s t  o f  h
2
.  T h u s ,  u s i n g  t h e  i d e n t i t y  s a l e s  =  s t o c k i n g  q u a n t i t y  - l e f t o v e r s  




+  q n  +  q z  a n d  Z ;  =  S ; - a ;  +  b ; p ;  f o r i  =  1  a n d  2 ,  w e  c a n  w r i t e :  
( 1 )  
w h e r e ,  
( 2 )  
a n d  
( 3 )  
I n  ( 1 ) ,  t h e  e x p r e s s i o n  i n  b r a c k e t s  r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  e x p e c t e d  p r o f i t  a t t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  d e c i s i o n s  m a d e  a t  t h e  
b e g i n n i n g  o f  t h e  f i r s t  s e l l i n g  s e a s o n ,  a n d  E [ T I ( Q , z J ) ]  r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  e x p e c t e d  p r o f i t  a t t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  
s e c o n d  s e l l i n g  s e a s o n ,  w h i c h  i s  b a s e d  o n  t h e  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  t h a t  i n f o r m a t i o n  o b t a i n e d  f r o m  m a r k e t  1  i s  
t r a n s f e r r e d  t o  m a r k e t  2  a n d  t h a t  a n  o p t i m a l  p o l i c y  t h e n  i s  f o l l o w e d  i n  m a r k e t  2 .  I n  ( 2 )  a n d  ( 3 ) ,  t  d e n o t e s  
t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  o b t a i n e d  i n  m a r k e t  1  a n d  t r a n s f e r r e d  t o  m a r k e t  2 :  I f  l e f t o v e r s  r e m a i n  a t  t h e  e n d  o f  t h e  
f i r s t  s e l l i n g  s e a s o n ,  t h e n  t  d e n o t e s  t h e  r e a l i z e d  v a l u e  o f  E 1  t h a t  i s  i n f e r r e d ;  i f  l e f t o v e r s  d o  n o t  r e m a i n ,  t h e n  
t  d e n o t e s  t h e  l o w e r  b o u n d  f o r  E 1  t h a t  i s  i n f e r r e d  ( n a m e l y ,  Z J ) .  I n  e i t h e r  c a s e ,  R .  =  Z 1  - t  i n d i c a t e s  t h e  
r e a l i z e d  n u m b e r  o f  l e f t o v e r s  f r o m  m a r k e t  1 ,  w h i c h  e s t a b l i s h e s  t h e  m a x i m u m  n u m b e r  o f  u n i t s  a v a i l a b l e  
f o r  t r a n s f e r  t o  m a r k e t  2 .  
T h e  o b j e c t i v e  i s  t o  s o l v e  ( 1 )  a n d  t h e r e b y  d e t e r m i n e  t h e  o p t i m a l  d e c i s i o n  p o l i c y  f o r  m a r k e t  l ,  w h i c h  w e  




* , Q * ) .  H o w e v e r ,  s o l v i n g  ( I )  r e q u i r e s  t h e  c o m p u t a t i o n  o f  ( 2 ) ,  w h i c h  r e q u i r e s  f i r s t  
s o l v i n g  ( 3 ) ,  t h e  r e c o u r s e  p r o b l e m .  T h u s ,  s o l v i n g  ( 1 )  r e q u i r e s  t h e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  c o n d i t i o n a l  
o p t i m a l  d e c i s i o n  p o l i c y  f o r  m a r k e t  2 ,  w h i c h  d e p e n d s  o n  t ,  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  o b t a i n e d  d u r i n g  t h e  f i r s t  
s e l l i n g  s e a s o n .  W e  d e n o t e  t h e  c o n d i t i o n a l  o p t i m a l  d e c i s i o n  p o l i c y  f o r  m a r k e t  2  a s  ( p z *  , q J * , q ! 2 * , q z * ) .  
1 1  
3 ANALYSIS OF THE RECOURSE PROBLEM 
In this section, we analyze the recourse problem using a two-step procedure: First, we determine 
(pz*,qJ*,q1z*,qz*), the conditionally-optimal solution to (3), given t, the information obtained during the 
first selling season; and second, we compute (2), the expected profit associated with the solution to (3), 
by un-conditiouing on t. Then, we incorporate foreign exchange risk into the analysis to demonstrate 
the recourse problem as an extension to the global newsvendor problem. And, we close with a 
discussion of the more general applicability of the recourse solution. 
Detertnining the Recourse Decisions 
Since the manager making the recourse decisions has three distinct sources from which to establish the 
desired stocking quantity for market 2, the recourse decision problem can be viewed as a three-supplier 
generalization of the news vendor problem with pricing. Recall that the stocking quantity for market 2 is 
S2 = q1 + q1z + q2. The quantity q2 is purchased from a supplier who has unlimited capacity. The 
constant marginal cost of these units is c2. The quantity q1z is purchased from a "supplier" who has 
random capacity L1. although the value of L1 is realized prior to the determination of q12. (L1 refers to 
the number of leftovers from market 1.) The constant marginal cost of these units is c12• Finally, the 
quantity q1 is purchased from a supplier who has fixed capacity Q. The constant marginal cost of these 
units is co. (In the recourse problem described in Section 2, co= 0. However, we introduce co here to 
complete the generalization.) Recall, the right to purchase up to Q units from this supplier is purchased 
for c1 Q prior to the start of the fitst selling season. 









S z  
=  q 1  +  q 1 2  +  q z  
( 6 )  
z z  
=  
S z  - a z  +  b z p z  
( 7 )  
L J  =  
Z 1  - t  
( 8 )  
0  =  C o  <  C 1 2  <  C z  
( 9 )  
R e l a t i o n s h i p  ( 9 )  e s t a b l i s h e s  a  p r e f e r e n c e  a m o n g  s o u r c e s  o f  s t o c k  f o r  m a r k e t  2 .  S t r i c t l y  s p e a k i n g ,  t h e r e  
m a y  b e  n o  p r e f e r e n c e  b e t w e e n  t h e  s o u r c e  t h a t  c h a r g e s  t h e  p e r - u n i t  c o s t  c o  a n d  t h e  s o u r c e  t h a t  c h a r g e s  t h e  
p e r - u n i t  c o s t  c 1 2  ( i f  c 1 2  = c o =  0 ) ;  h o w e v e r  t h i s  w o u l d  r e p r e s e n t  a  d e g e n e r a t e  c a s e  i n  w h i c h  t h e  t h r e e -
s u p p l i e r  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n  c o l l a p s e s  t o  a  t w o - s u p p l i e r  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n .  I n  s u c h  a  c a s e ,  o n e  s o u r c e  o f  s u p p l y  
w o u l d  c h a r g e  c z  a n d  w o u l d  h a v e  u n l i m i t e d  c a p a c i t y ,  a n d  t h e  o t h e r  s o u r c e  o f  s u p p l y  w o u l d  c h a r g e  c
0  
=  
c 1 2  a n d  w o u l d  h a v e  a  c a p a c i t y  l i m i t  o f  Q  +  L 1  u n i t s .  S i n c e  t h e  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  t w o - s u p p l i e r  
g e n e r a l i z a t i o n  i s  a n a l o g o u s  t o  t h e  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  t h r e e - s u p p l i e r  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n ,  w e  a s s u m e  t h a t  t h e  
p r e f e r e n c e  b e t w e e n  c
0  
a n d  c
1 2  
i s  s t r i c t .  T h u s ,  ( 9 )  i m p l i e s  t h a t  n o  u n i t s  s h o u l d  b e  a c q u i r e d  a t  a  p e r - u n i t  
c o s t  o f  c
1
z  u n l e s s  Q  u n i t s  a r e  a c q u i r e d  a t  a  p e r - u n i t  c o s t  o f  c o ;  a n d ,  n o  u n i t s  s h o u l d  b e  a c q u i r e d  a t  a  p e r -
u n i t  c o s t  o f  C z  u n l e s s  L 1  u n i t s  a r e  a c q u i r e d  a t  a  p e r - u n i t  c o s t  o f  c 1 2 .  
I n  o t h e r  w o r d s ,  i n  d e t e r m i n i n g  h o w  m a n y  u n i t s  s h o u l d  b e  a c q u i r e d  f o r  m a r k e t  2  f r o m  e a c h  o f  t h e  t h r e e  
s o u r c e s  o f  s u p p l y ,  i t  i s  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  c h o o s e  o n l y  S
2
,  t h e  t o t a l  s t o c k i n g  q u a n t i t y .  W e  s t a t e  t h i s  
o b s e r v a t i o n  f o r m a l l y  a s  L e m m a  1 .  
L E M M A  1 .  G i v e n  a  c h o i c e  f o r  S z ,  t h e  o p t i m a l  a l l o c a t i o n  o f t h i s  s t o c k i n g  q u a n t i t y  a m o n g  t h e  t h r e e  
s o u r c e s  o f  s t o c k  i s :  
T h i s  r e s u l t  l e a d s  t o  L e m m a  2 ,  t h e  p r o o f  f o r  w h i c h  i s  i n  t h e  a p p e n d i x .  
L E M M A 2 .  G i v e n  t ,  t h e  o p t i m a l  s e l l i n g  p r i c e  a n d  t h e  o p t i m a l  s t o c k i n g  q u a n t i t y  f o r  m a r k e t  2  c a n  b e  
d e t e r m i n e d  a s  f u n c t i o n s  o f  z z  a s  f o l l o w s :  
1 3  
(a) 
(b) 
*IS = (z It)- a2 +z2 -'-A2(z21t)-b2h2F2(z21t) 
P2 2 - P2 2 - b2[1+Fz(z21 t)] 
S2*1z2 = S2(z2 1t) 
A 2 (z2 1 t) + (a2 + b2h 2 + z 2 )Fz (z2 1 t) 
1+Fz(z2 1 t) 
where A2 (z2 1 t) = J:2 F2 (x 2 1 t)dx 2 represents the expected number ofleftovers in 
market2. 
Lemma 2(a) provides a simple prescription for computing the optimal selling price for market 2, if a 
value for Sz is given. One interesting property of this prescription is that pz*ISz can be expressed solely 
as a function of z2, the stocking factor for market 2. Given this property, the stocking quantity for 
market 2 also can be expressed as a function of the market 2 stocking factor (Lemma 2(b)). 
Thus, the problem of determining (pz*,qJ*,qJ2*,qz*), the optimal decision vector for the second selling 
period, reduces to an optimization problem over a single variable. Specifically, ( 4) can be transformed 
into a problem written strictly as a function of zz: 
TI(Q,zJ!t)=maxz2 R(zzlt) 
where, 
s.t. q1 (zz It) S Q 
ql2 (zzl t) s L1 
(10) 
and where Cjj(Zzlt) is short for CJi(Sz(zzlt)), for j = 1, 12, and 2. Let zz* denote the solution to (10). Then 
the optimal recourse policy can be recovered as follows: from Lemma 2(a), p2* = p2(zz*lt) and, from 
Lemma 1, (qJ*,q!2*,qz*) = (qJ(Sz(zz*lt)), qJz(Sz(zz*lt}}, qz(Sz(zz*lt))), where Sz(zz*lt) is obtained from 
Lemma2(b). 
To solve (10) and thus, to determine z2*, we establish and interpret a series oflemmas, the proofs for 
which are provided in the appendix. 
LEMMA3. There exists a zz, say ZQ, that is such that Sz(zzlt) <: Q if and only if zz < ZQ. Likewise, 
there exists a Zz, say ZQ+t.. that is such that Sz(zzlt) < Q + L1 if and only if zz < ZQ+L· 
Moreover, ZQ :O; ZQ+L· 
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L E M M A 4 .  D e f i n e  M ( z z l t )  =  [ p z ( z z l t )  +  h z ) [ l  - F z ( z z l t ) ] .  I f  
( a )  a z  >  b z c z ;  a n d  
( b )  d g z ( z z ! t ) l d z z  +  2 g z ( z z ! t i  >  0 ,  w h e r e  g z ( z z l t )  =  f z ( z z l t ) l [ l - F z ( z z l t ) ]  i s  t h e  h a z a r d  r a t e  
a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  e
2
;  
t h e n ,  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a  z
2
,  s a y  z m ,  t h a t  i s  s u c h  t h a t  M ( z z l t )  >  c z  +  h z  ~ z z  <  z m ;  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a  
z z ,  s a y  z u ,  t h a t  i s  s u c h  t h a t  M ( z z l t )  >  c 1 2  +  h z  ~ Z z  <  z u ;  a n d  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a  z z ,  s a y  z , ,  t h a t  
i s  s u c h  t h a t  M ( z z l t )  >  c o +  h z  ~ z z  <  z , .  M o r e o v e r ,  z m  <  Z n  <  z , .  
L e m m a s  3  a n d  4  p r o v i d e  m a t h e m a t i c a l  p r o p e r t i e s  u s e f u l  f o r  s o l v i n g  ( 1  0 ) .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  L e m m a  2  
i n t r o d u c e s  c o n d i t i o n s  t o  e n s u r e  t r a c t a b i l i t y :  C o n d i t i o n  ( a )  p r o v i d e s  s o m e  a s s u r a n c e  t h a t  m a r k e t  2  
d e m a n d  i s  p o s i t i v e .  A n d ,  C o n d i t i o n  ( b )  e s t a b l i s h e s  a  t r a c t a b i l i t y  t e s t  f o r  t h e  r e c o u r s e  p r o b l e m .  I t  w i l l  b e  
s a t i s f i e d ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  i f  E z  i s  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  b y  a  d i s t r i b u t i o n  h a v i n g  a  n o n - d e c r e a s i n g  h a z a r d  r a t e .  
D i s t r i b u t i o n s  h a v i n g  a  n o n - d e c r e a s i n g  h a z a r d  r a t e  a r e  c o m m o n p l a c e  ( s e e  B a r l o w  a n d  P r o s c h a n ,  1 9 6 5 ,  
f o r  e x a m p l e s ) ;  h o w e v e r ,  i t  i s  n o t  e n o u g h  s i m p l y  t o  a s s u m e  a t  t h e  o n s e t  t h a t  F
2
( . ! t )  i s  s u c h  a  d i s t r i b u t i o n .  
T h i s  i s  b e c a u s e  F
2
( . ! t )  i s  n o t  c o n s t r u c t e d  u n t i l  a f t e r  i n f o r m a t i o n  i s  g a t h e r e d  f r o m  t h e  f i r s t  s e l l i n g  s e a s o n .  
M o r e o v e r ,  F
2
( . ! t )  d e p e n d s  o n  t h e  t y p e  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  g a t h e r e d  ( f u l l  o r  c e n s o r e d ) .  A s  a  r e s u l t ,  t h e  
p r o p e r t i e s  o f F
2
( . ! t )  a r e  s e n s i t i v e  t o  t h e  s p e c i f i c  c o n s t r u c t  b y  w h i c h  E
1  
a n d  E z  a r e  r e l a t e d .  F o r  n o w ,  w e  
a s s u m e  t h a t  C o n d i t i o n  ( b )  h o l d s  s o  t h a t  w e  m a y  p r o c e e d ;  a n d  t h e n ,  i n  S e c t i o n  4 ,  w e  i d e n t i f y  c o n d i t i o n s  
t o  a s s u r e  t h a t  t h i s  a s s u m p t i o n  i s  v a l i d .  
N e x t ,  w e  n o t e  f r o m  L e m m a  3  t h a t ,  f o r  a  g i v e n  t ,  Z Q  ! >  Z Q + L ·  A n d ,  w e  n o t e  f r o m  L e m m a  4  t h a t ,  f o r  a  
g i v e n  t ,  z m  <  z u  <  z , .  H o w e v e r ,  z z *  a n d  c o n s e q u e n t l y ,  t h e  o p t i m a l  r e c o u r s e  p o l i c y  ( p z * , q , * , q , z * , q z * )  
d e p e n d s  o n  h o w  Z Q + L  a n d  Z Q  a r e  r e l a t e d  t o  z~, z u ,  a n d  z m .  W e  t a b u l a t e  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  a n d  t h e  
c o r r e s p o n d i n g  r e s u l t s  i n  L e m m a  5 .  T h e  t e c h n i c a l  d e t a i l s  a r e  p r o v i d e d  i n  t h e  a p p e n d i x .  























1  t )  
R  n  ( z z l  t ) =  ( p z  ( z z i t ) - C J z  ) s z  ( z z i  t ) - ( p z  ( z z l  t )  +  h z  ) A z  ( z z i t )  +  ( c l z  - c o  ) Q  
R m ( z
2




















j t )  +  ( c z  - c o ) Q  +  ( c z  - c l 2 ) L l  
T h e n ,  z z *  a n d  t h e  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  c o n d i t i o n a l l y - o p t i m a l  e x p e c t e d  r e c o u r s e  p r o f i t  c a n  b e  
c o m p u t e d  a s  f o l l o w s :  
1 5  
IF ... THEN,Z2*= AND, Il(Q,ziit) = 
ZQ+L<zm zm Rm(zmlt) 
Zm < ZQ+L < Zn ZQ+L Rn(ZQ+dt) 
ZQ<zn<ZQ+L zu Rn(znlt) 
Zn < ZQ < ZJ ZQ RI(zoJt) 
z1 <zQ ZI RI(ZIIt) 
Together, Lemmas 1-5 imply a procedure for solving the recourse problem optimally. Next, we 
summarize this conditionally-optimal policy, as well as the procedure for determining it. Then, we 
interpret and discuss the policy. 
THEOREM 1. If, for a given t, conditions (a) and (b) ofLemma4 are satisfied, then (p2*,q1*,q12*,q2*), 
the conditionally-optimal recourse policy, can be determined as follows: 
Y' Obtain t from market 1 and use it to construct S2(z2lt) from Lemma 2(b) and M(z2lt) 
from Lemma 4. Also, use it to determine L1 from (8). 
2"d Compute ZQ, ZQ+L. ZI. zn. and zm as the unique solutions to S2(zQit) = Q, S2(ZQ+dt) = 
Q + L1. M(zmlt) = c2+h2, M(zult) = c12+h2, and M(zdt) = co+h2, respectively. 
3'd Sort ZQ, ZQ+L. ZI. zu, and zm, and then determine z2* from Lemma 5. 
4'h Compute S2* and P2* from Lemma 2 as follows: 
Ifz2* = Then,S2* = And,p2* = 
zm b2 {p2* -c2 )+ A 2 (zm I t) ( h ) F2(zml t) c2 + c2 + 2 
. 1-F2(zm It) 
Q+L1 
a2 +zQ+L -(Q+LI) 
ZQ+L b2 
zu b2 (p2* -c12 )+ A2 (zrr I t) 
( · h ) F2 (zu I t) 
cl2 + cl2 + 2 1-F2(zu It) 
Q 
a 2 +zQ -Q 
ZQ b2 
ZJ b 2 {p2* -co)+ A2 (z1 It) ( h ) F2 (z1 It) co+ co+ 2 1- F2(z1 It) 
5'h Compute qi*.q12*,and q2* from Lemma 1 as follows: q1* = min{S2*,Q}. q12* = 
min{S2*,Q+LI} -q1*, and q2* = S2*- q1* -q2*· 
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In summary, z~. zn, zm. ZQ, and ZQ+L can be computed and sorted only after tis obtained from market 1. 
Then, depending on the results of the sorting, zz*, the conditionally-optimal stocking factor for market 
2, can be determined from Lemma 5. Once zz* is determined, the conditionally-optimal recourse policy 
can be recovered by applying Lemmas 1 and 2. The five scenarios correspond, in effect, to the 
"goodness" with which market 2 demand is estimated at the start of the first selling season. For 
example, the scenario ZQ ~ z1 corresponds to the situation in which market 2 demand initially is 
overestimated by a significant amount. In this scenario, the response to learning that market 2 demand 
is smaller than estimated is to discard all of the leftovers from market I and to discard a portion of Q, 
the amount initially procured for market 2. The corresponding "cost" of making this initial 
overestimation of market 2 demand is the purchase cost initially paid for the units that ultimately are 
discarded rather than made available for sale. This type of cost is analogous to paying insurance 
premiums on a policy for which no claim is ever submitted. 
At the other end of the spectrum, the scenario ZQ+L:::;; zm corresponds to the situation in which market 2 
demand initially is underestimated by a significant amount. In this scenario, the response to learning 
that market 2 demand is larger than estimated is not only to supplement Q with all of the leftovers from 
market 1, but also to augment that sum with enough additional units to bring the stocking quantity for 
market 2 up to Sz(zmlt). The corresponding "cost" of making the initial underestimation of market 2 
demand is the incremental purchase cost of the extra units at the premium price. This type of cost is 
analogous to having out-of-pocket expenses exceed the maximum coverage of an insurance policy. 
Another interesting observation from Theorem 1 is the following set of interpretations regarding the 
optimal recourse selling price and stocking quantity: The "desired" selling price is a price that includes 
a mark-up over the marginal cost of purchasing the next unit, where the mark-up is set equal to the 
marginal cost of having the next unit be left over (Cj + hz) times the "odds" that the next unit will be left 
over. (Since Fz(zz*it) denotes the probability of having the next unit be left over and 1 - Fz(zz*it) 
denotes the probability of having the next unit not be left over, we interpret the ratio of Fz(z2*it) to 1 -
F2(z2*it) as the odds that the next unit will be left over.) The corresponding desired stocking quantity is 
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the amount that equates expected sales (Sz*- Az(zz*lt)) to bz times the optimal mark-up in price (pz*-
Cj). However, if the decision maker is constrained not to operate at one of the desired price/quantity 
combinations, then the "consolation" selling price is the price that clears the existing inventory. 
Computing the Expected Profit of the Recourse Problem 
In the previous subsection, we demonstrated how to determine the optimal recourse policy and the 
associated expected profit for the second selling period, for a given t. However, t represents information 
obtained from market 1 's operations and hence, does not become available until the conclusion of the 
first selling period. Since we are interested not only in behaving optimally in the second selling period, 
but also in behaving optimally in the first selling period given the understanding that an optimal course 
of action will be followed in the second selling period based on the information obtained from the first, 
we need to consider in expectation what will occur in the second selling period. In other words, to 
determine the optimal course of action for the first selling period, we need to consider E[II(Q,z1)], 
which, given (2),can be obtained from Lemma 5 by un-conditioning on t. 
Computing E[II(Q,z1)] can be quite difficult because, given Q and ZJ. it involves,for every possible 
value oft: (1) running through the procedure detailed in Theorem 1 and using the output to generate 
II(Q,zllt), and then (2) weighting the obtained value of II(Q,z1lt) by the likelihood that twill take the 
value used in the iteration. However, we need not make such detailed computations here. 1n this 
subsection, we ascertain analytical properties ofE[II(Q,zJ)] that will prove useful (in Section 5) for 
analyzing the first-period decision problem and for developing insight based on that analysis. 
From (8), t = z1 - L1 represents information that is based on the number of leftovers remaining at the 
conclusion of the first selling season. But, recall that L1 = max{z1- E1. Of. Thus, for any realized value 
of EJ. say X1, we get t =min{ z~oxd. And, from t, the optimal recourse policy can be determined 
according to Theorem 1 and then the corresponding optimal expected profit can be determined 
according to Lemma 5. 
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.  I f  x 1  <  Z t ,  t h e n  t  =  X 1  ( i n  o t h e r  w o r d s ,  i f  x 1  <  z~, t h e n  
x
1  
i s  o b s e r v a b l e ) .  I n  t h i s  c a s e ,  t h e  r e a l i z e d  n u m b e r  o f l e f t o v e r s  i s £ =  Z 1 - X 1  >  0 .  T h i s  i m p l i e s  t h a t  Q  +  




)  >  Q  a n d  h e n c e ,  L e m m a  5  i n d i c a t e s  f i v e  p o s s i b l e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  f o r  I l ( Q , z 1  I  t  =  z 1 ) :  
R m ( Z m  I  x l )  
" f  <  
I  Z Q + z , - : x ,  - Z m  
R n ( Z Q + z , - x ,  I  x
1
)  
i f  z
1 1 1  
<  z Q + z , - x ,  <  Z n  
I I ( Q , z
1
1  t  =  x
1
)  =  R u ( z u  I  x
1
)  
" f  <  <  
I  Z Q  _  Z n  - Z Q + z , - x ,  
R J ( Z Q  I  X I )  
i f  Z n  <  Z Q  <  z
1  
R J ( Z J  I  X I )  
i f  Z J  : : : ;  Z Q  
I f  x
1  
2 :  Z t ,  t h e n  t  =  z
1  
( i n  o t h e r  w o r d s ,  i f  x
1  
2 :  Z t ,  t h e n  X 1  i s  n o t  o b s e r v a b l e ) .  I n  t h i s  c a s e ,  t h e  r e a l i z e d  
n u m b e r  o f  l e f t o v e r s  i s  £  =  0 .  T h i s  i m p l i e s  t h a t  Q  +  £  =  Q  a n d  h e n c e ,  T a b l e  I  i n d i c a t e s  t h r e e  p o s s i b l e  
a l t e r n a t i v e s  f o r  I I ( Q , z
1  
I  t  =  z
1
)  i n s t e a d  o f  f i v e :  
R  I I I  ( z m  I  z
1
)  i f  z Q  : : : ;  z m  
I I ( Q , z
1
1  t  =  z
1
)  =  R
1
( z Q  I  z
1
)  i f  z m  <  z Q  <  z
1  
( 1 2 )  
( 1 3 )  
G i v e n  ( 1 2 )  a n d  ( 1 3 ) ,  w e  n o w  e s t a b l i s h ,  i n  T h e o r e m  2 ,  t w o  b a s i c  p r o p e r t i e s  o f  E [ I I ( Q , z 1 l t ) J  t h a t  w e  u s e  i n  
S e c t i o n  5  w h e n  a n a l y z i n g  t h e  f i r s t - p e r i o d  d e c i s i o n  p r o b l e m .  T h e  p r o o f  i s  p r o v i d e d  i n  t h e  a p p e n d i x .  
T H E O R E M  2 .  ( a )  G i v e n  Z t ,  E [ I I ( Q , z 1 ) ]  i s  n o n - d e c r e a s i n g  a n d  c o n c a v e  i n  Q .  
( b )  G i v e n  Q ,  i f  i l F z ( x  I t =  Z t ) l i l z t : : ;  0 ,  t h e n  E [ I I ( Q , z t ) l  i s  n o n - d e c r e a s i n g  i n  Z t .  
I n  T h e o r e m  2 ( b ) ,  t h e  c o n d i t i o n  t h a t  F z ( x  I t =  Z t )  b e  n o n - i n c r e a s i n g  i n  Z t  i s  a  n a t u r a l  o n e .  I t  w o u l d  b e  
s a t i s f i e d ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  i f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  m a r k e t  I  d e m a n d  a n d  m a r k e t  2  d e m a n d  w e r e  s u c h  t h a t  
a  l a r g e r  r e a l i z e d  d e m a n d  i n  m a r k e t  I  c o r r e s p o n d e d  t o  a  p r o b a b i l i s t i c a l l y  l a r g e r  d e m a n d  i n  m a r k e t  2 .  I n  
S e c t i o n  4 ,  w e  s p e c i f y  a  c o n s t r u c t  r e l a t i n g  E
1  
a n d  E z ;  a n d ,  i n  d o i n g  s o ,  w e  i d e n t i f y  c o n d i t i o n s  t h a t  a s s u r e  
n o t  o n l y  t h a t  L e m m a  4 ,  C o n d i t i o n  ( b )  w i l l  b e  s a t i s f i e d ,  b u t  a l s o  t h a t  t h e  c o n d i t i o n  i n  T h e o r e m  2 ( b )  w i l l  
b e  s a t i s f i e d .  
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Incorporating Foreign Exchange Risk 
As indicated in the introduction, one potential application Of the modeling approach presented in this 
paper is the global newsvendor problem. In such an application, a risk arises due to fluctuations in 
foreign exchange rates. In this subsection, we introduce a method for modeling foreign exchange risk 
that preserves the validity of Theorem 2. Like Kouvelis and Gutierrez (1997), we assume that the 
foreign exchange rate can be observed before the recourse decisions are made. 
Suppose market 2 is in a country foreign to the home country (where market 1 is in the home country) 
so that demand for market 2 is a function of the selling price, when the selling price is stated in units of 
the foreign currency. Thus, if P2 is set in the currency of the home country, say US$, then demand for 
market 2 is determined after first converting p2 into the foreign currency: D(p2,e2) = a2- b2(T]p2) + e2, 
where T] denotes the random foreign exchange rate. If we Jet ~2 = b2T], then this demandfunction is 
equivalent to the demand function used previously for market 2 (D(p2,e2) = a2 - ~2P2 + e2) except that 
the slope of the function becomes a random variable that is realized prior to the determination of P2· 
What we find is that this complication adds computational complexity to the recourse problem, but it 
does not affect the analytical properties stated in Theorem 2: 
THEOREM 3. Let D(pz,e2,~2) = a2 - ~2p2 + e2 denote the demand function for market 2, wbere e2 and ~2 
are random variables and ~2 is independent of fJ. Suppose that ~2 is realized prior to 
setting the market 2 decision policy and that e2 is realized after setting the policy. Then: 
(a) Given z~, E[Il(Q,z1)] is non-decreasing and concave in Q. 
(b) Given Q, if oF2(X It= Zi)lozl:::; 0, then E[il(Q,zl)] is non-decreasing in ZJ. 
Summary and General Applicability of the Recourse Analysis 
In Section 3, we demonstrated a solution procedure to assure that the recourse problem can be solved 
optimally after information obtained from market I is used to generate the distribution used to 
characterize the uncertainty in market 2 demand. The analysis resulted in a solution that could take any 
one of five forms depending on the realized capacity level of the second-choice supplier. Then, because 
the expected optimal recourse profit cannot be determined until information is made available at the 
conclusion of the first selling season, we established analytical properties of the expected optimal 
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r e c o u r s e  p r o f i t  i n  e x p e c t a t i o n  o f  t h e  i n f o n n a t i o n  t h a t  m i g h t  b e  o b t a i n e d .  F i n a l l y ,  b y  f o n n u l a t i n g  a  
m o d e l  i n  w h i c h  a  f o r e i g n  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  c a n  b e  a b s o r b e d  i n t o  a  p r i c e - d e p e n d e n t  d e m a n d  f u n c t i o n ,  w e  
d e m o n s t r a t e d  t h e  a p p l i c a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  r e c o u r s e  m o d e l  a s  a n  e x t e n s i o n  t o  t h e  g l o b a l  n e w s v e n d o r  p r o b l e m .  
A l t h o u g h  t h e  p r i m a r y  p u r p o s e  o f  S e c t i o n  3  i s  t o  p r o v i d e  a  b u i l d i n g  b l o c k  f o r  a n a l y z i n g  a n d  
u n d e r s t a n d i n g  t h e  t w o - p e r i o d  p r o b l e m  w i t h  l e a r n i n g  i n t r o d u c e d  i n  S e c t i o n  2 ,  w e  f i n d  t h a t  i t  h a s  m o r e  
g e n e r a l  a p p l i c a b i l i t y .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  S e c t i o n  3  p r o v i d e s  a  f o n n u l a t i o n ,  s o l u t i o n ,  a n d  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  a  
t h r e e - s u p p l i e r  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n  o f  a  n e w s  v e n d o r  p r o b l e m  w i t h  p r i c i n g .  T h e  t h r e e  s u p p l i e r s  a r e  s u c h  t h a t  
t h e  f i r s t - c h o i c e  s u p p l i e r  h a s  a  p r e d e t e r m i n e d  c a p a c i t y  c o n s t r a i n t  t h a t  i s  f i x e d ,  t h e  s e c o n d - c h o i c e  s u p p l i e r  
h a s  a  p r e - d e t e r m i n e d  c a p a c i t y  c o n s t r a i n t  t h a t  i s  g e n e r a t e d  r a n d o m l y ,  a n d  t h e  l a s t  - c h o i c e  s u p p l i e r  h a s  
u n l i m i t e d  c a p a c i t y .  T h i s  t h r e e - s u p p l i e r  c o n s t r u c t ,  h o w e v e r ,  c a n  b e  r e i n t e r p r e t e d  a s  a  s i n g l e - s u p p l i e r  
c o n s t r u c t  i n  w h i c h  t h e  c o s t  f u n c t i o n  o f  p u r c h a s i n g  f r o m  t h e  s u p p l i e r  i s  p i e c e w i s e  l i n e a r  a n d  c o n v e x  i n  
t h e  a m o u n t  o f  u n i t s  p r o c u r e d .  T h i s  i s  a  u s e f u l  r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  b e c a u s e  t h e  s t o c k i n g - q u a n t i t y  s o l u t i o n  f o r  
a  n e w s v e n d o r  w h o  f a c e s  s u c h  a  p u r c h a s i n g - c o s t  f u n c t i o n ,  b u t  d o e s  n o t  h a v e  t h e  l i b e r t y  o f  s e t t i n g  a  
s e l l i n g  p r i c e ,  i s  k n o w n  t o  b e  a  f i n i t e ,  g e n e r a l i z e d  b a s e - s t o c k  p o l i c y ,  w h i c h  i s  a  p o l i c y  t h a t  i s  
c h a r a c t e r i z e d  b y  a  s e q u e n c e  o f  o r d e r - u p  t o  l e v e l s  ( o n e  f o r  e a c h  s e g m e n t  o f  t h e  p i e c e w i s e  l i n e a r  c o s t  
f u n c t i o n )  a n d  b y  t h e  p r o p e r t y  t h a t  t h e  o p t i m a l  s t o c k i n g  q u a n t i t y  i s  a n  i n c r e a s i n g  f u r i c t i o n  o f  t h e  i n i t i a l  
i n v e n t o r y  l e v e l  ( P o r t e u s ,  1 9 9 0 ) .  T h e o r e m  I  e x p a n d s  t h i s  r e s u l t :  F o r a  n e w s v e n d o r  w h o  d o e s  h a v e  t h e  
l i b e r t y  o f  s e t t i n g  a  s e l l i n g  p r i c e ,  t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  a  f i n i t e ,  g e n e r a l i z e d  b a s e - s t o c k  p o l i c y  a p p l y  n o t  
o n l y  t o  t h e  o p t i m a l  s t o c k i n g  q u a n t i t y ,  b u t  a l s o  t o  t h e  o p t i m a l  s t o c k i n g  f a c t o r ,  w h i c h  i n c o r p o r a t e s  t h e  
a f f e c t s  o f  p r i c i n g .  T h u s ,  a n o t h e r  c o n t r i b u t i o n  o f  t h e  r e c o u r s e  m o d e l  i s  t h e  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n  o f  t h e  r e s u l t s  
o f  a  n e w s v e n d o r  m o d e l  i n  w h i c h  t h e  p u r c h a s i n g  c o s t  i s  p i e c e w i s e  l i n e a r  a n d  c o n v e x  t o  i n c l u d e  t h e  c a s e  
i n  w h i c h  d e m a n d  i s  p r i c e - d e p e n d e n t  a n d  p r i c i n g  i s  a  d e c i s i o n  v a r i a b l e .  
4  R E L A T I N G  E 1  A N D  E 2  A N D  T H E  T R A N S F E R  O F  I N F O R M A T I O N  B E T W E E N  M A R K E T S  
F r o m  L e m m a  4 ,  t h e  t r a c t a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  s o l u t i o n  p r o c e d u r e  a n a l y z e d  i n  S e c t i o n  3  t o  d e t e r m i n e  t h e  o p t i m a l  
r e c o u r s e  p o l i c y  i s  b a s e d  o n  t h e  a s s u m p t i o n  t h a t  F z ( x j t ) ,  w h i c h  c a n n o t  b e  c o n s t r u c t e d  u n t i l  t  i s  o b t a i n e d ,  
i s  s u c h  t h a t  a g
2
( x j t ) / d x  +  2 g z ( x j t i  >  0 ,  w h e r e  g z ( x j t )  =  f z ( x j t ) / [ 1  - F z ( x j t ) ] .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  f r o m  T h e o r e m  2 ,  
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the result that E[II(Q,z1)] is non-decreasing in z1 is based on the assumption that aF2Cx I t = z1)/ilz1 ~ 0. 
For the purpose of completing the recourse analysis, we assumed that these properties exist. However, 
these are hardly superfluous assumptions since the form of F2Cxlt) can differ depending on whether t 
represents full information or censored information. Therefore, to test the validity of these assumptions, 
we introduce a specific framework in this section to link markets 1 and 2. Applying the framework, 
then, we identify conditions to assure F2C-It) will inherit the desired properties. 
Suppose that c1 and c2 are related in some fashion, but either the relationship between c1 and c2 is an 
uncertain one, or inherent noise exists in one or both of the two market demand structures. In other 
words, suppose that the scenario is such that some degree of uncertainty will always be present in 
market 2, regardless of what is observed in market 1. As a result, even if the realized value of c1 can be 
observed, it cannot be used to resolve all uncertainty embedded in e2; it could be used only to re-
characterize c2. And, to complicate the informational dynamics further, there is no guarantee that the 
realized value of c1 will be observed in the first place: if no leftovers occur in market 1, then only a 
lower bound for the realized value of c1 will be observed. 
To operationalize this construct, let c1 and c2 be drawings from the same distribution, but suppose that 
distribution includes an unknown parameter, e. Then the distribution from which c1 and c2 are drawn, 
say <I>Cxle), is a conditional one that depends on a given value for e. Since e is unknown, we assign 
h0(e), a subjective density function, to characterize e prior to the start of the first selling season. As a 
result, f\ (x) = I <I>(x I e)h0 (e)de. Then, given t, ho(e) can be updated to hJ(elt) using Bayes' formula ~ . 
and F2Cxlt) can be constructed accordingly. 
A technical difficulty of this approach is that, in general, the specific form ofh1(elt) and consequently, 
the specific form of F2Cxlt), depends. on the type of information obtained from the first selling season. In 
particular, it depends on whether t = x1 (full information) or t = z1 (censored information). Thus, a 
weakness of the Bayesian approach is that it might hinder tractability: in general, the conditions 
specified in Lemma 4(b) and Theorem 2(b) must be satisfied for two different functional forms. 
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However, this weakness can be overcome if cl>(xiB) belongs to the family of "newsboy distributions" 
(Braden and Freimer, 1991). A newsboy distribution is defined as folJows: cl>(xiB) = 1- e·Sn(x), where 
n(x) is increasing in x. When a newsboy distribution is paired with an h0(9) that is a member of the 
exponential family of densities, F2(xlt) shares the same structural form with FI(x), regardless of whether 
hi(Bit) is updated from at that represents fulJ or censored information. For example, Braden and 
Freimer demonstrate that if cl>(xiB) = 1- e·exl. (a WeibulJ distribution) and if h0(9) = [~atr(a)]Ba-Ie·~ (a 
gamma density function), then: 
and 
I-1) (x) =( ~ )a ~+xt.. (14) 
(15) 
(16) 
Notice that F2(x It= XI) has the same form as FI(x); the only difference is that F2(x It= XI) includes a+ 
I in place of a and~+ x/ in place of~- Similarly, F2(x It= z1) is equivalent to F1(x) except that~+ 
z/ replaces ~-
This example suggests that, with suitable restrictions on the parameters of the newsboy-gamma pair, 
F2(xjt) can be assured to inherit the properties required for the validity of Lemma 4(b) and Theorem 
2(b ). Theorem 4 specifies such restrictions. 
THEOREM 4. Ifcl>(xjB) =I- e·Sn(x) and ho(B) = [~atr(a)]Ba-Ie-~8, then d2ri(x)/dx2 ~ 0 and a> V2 together 
imply that ilg2(xjt)/ilz + Zg2(xjti > 0 and iiF2(x I t = ZI)/ilzi ~ 0. 
Thus, to assure that the conditions in Lemma 4(b) and Theorem 2(b) wiiJ be satisfied after t is obtained 
from market I, it suffices to have h0(9) be a gamma density with a ~ V2 and cl>(xj9) be a newsboy 
distribution with a convex n(x). Note that the WeibulJ distribution has n(x) = x\ which is convex for A. 
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2: 1. Note also that the sufficiency conditions stated in Theorem 4 are the same conditions that would be 
applicable if the market :2 decision problem were an independent, single-period problem with a 
distribution function for E2 that was of the form (14). Finally, it is important to note that even with the 
restrictions stated in Theorem 4, the newsboy-gamma pair provides a great deal of flexibility for 
approximating a wide range of empirical sales data. 
5 ANALYSIS OF THE FIRST-PERIOD PROBLEM 
Given the results of Sections 3 and 4, we now are ready to analyze (1), the first-period decision problem, 
which is to determine (p1*,S1*,Q*), the first-period decisions, given that information obtained from 
market 1 will be transferred to market 2 and that an optimal policy then will be followed in market 2. 
We begin the analysis by making the observation that although both PI and sl influence the optimal 
expected recourse profit, they do so in a prescribed way. In particular, the links between (p1, S1) and the 
recourse decisions can be captured completely through Z1 = S1 + b1P1 - a~o the market 1 stocking factor. 
We exploit this observation by recasting the first-period decision problem in terms of z~o p~o and Q so 
that p1 can be solved myopically (alternatively, we could recast the problem in terms of z~o S~o and Q; 
and then solve for sl myopically). To demonstrate, we define AI (Zj) = r:J Fl (Xj)dxl as the expected 
number of leftovers in market 1. Then, we substitute forS1 = a1- b1p1 + Z1 in (1) and re-write the fust-





NQ (Q,z1) = -c1Q + E[II(Q,z1)] (19) 
Thus, the first-period decision problem is separable in PI and Q. As a result, ifz1 were fixed, then P1*lzl 
could be found by maximizing Np(p~oz1) and Q*jz1 could be found by maximizing NQ(Q,z1). This 
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observation leads to Lemma 6, which specifies the optimal first-period decisions as unique functions of 
a pre-detennined stocking factor for market 1. The proof is in the appendix. 
LEMMA6. The optimal first-period decisions can be detennined uniquely as functions of ZJ as 
follows: 
(c) Q* I ZJ = Q(zJ) satisfies: 
From Lemma 6, if a value of Z1 is given, then P1* and S1* can be detennined explicitly. And, although 
the detennination ofQ1*jz1* requires solving an implicit function, efficient computational techniques 
can be employed because the solution to this implicit function is unique. Moreover, this implicit 
function has intuitive appeal: For a given ZJ. Q1 * is the value of Q that equates expected marginal 
revenue (ilE[TI(Q,zJ)]/oQ) with expected marginal cost (cJ); if expected marginal revenue is strictly less 
than expected marginal cost for all Q, then Q1 *lz1 = 0. 
As a result of Lemma 6, the problem of detennining (p1*,S1*,Q*), the optimal decision vector for the 
first selling period, reduces to an optimization problem over z1: 
That is, the two-period decision problem with recourse, which includes as many as seven decisions 
(including recourse decisions) can be transformed into a single-decision problem. In particular, the 
problem reduces to a search for z1*, the optimal stocking factor for market 1. Then, given z1*, all 
optimal decisions can be detennined: (pJ*,S1*,Q*), the first-period decisions, can be detennined 
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(20) 
immediately from Lemma 6; and (pz*,qt*,qtz*,qz*) can be detennined from Theorem 1 after the first 
selling period concludes and tis collected. 
We have had little success identifying general analytical conditions under which Np(p1(z1),zt) + 
NQ(Q(zt),Zt) is sufficiently well-behaved so as to guarantee that Zt * can be found using simple search 
algorithms. Nevertheless, since we have reduced the two-period decision problem with recourse to a 
single-variable model, even a worst-case scenario involving an exhaustive search can be performed 
fairly painlessly, given the widespread accessibility of capable computing technology. And, under 
suitable conditions identified below, an accessible lower bound can be detennined to reduce the search 
domain for Zt*· This lower bound corresponds to the myopic optimal stocking factor for market 1. 
To demonstrate, first define Zsp as the optimal stocking factor for market I if the first-selling period were 
treated as a single-period problem. Then, Zsp = argmax{Np(p1(z1),z1)}. From Petruzzi and Dada 
(1999a), Zsp can be found efficiently for the general class of distributions that satisfy dg1(x)/dx + 2g1(xi 
> 0, where g1(x) = ft(x)/[1- Ft(x)] is the hazard rate function associated with 1::1. Theorem 5 establishes 
that Zsp is a lower bound for z1* if the relationship between market 1 and market 2 is such that Theorem 
4 applies. The proof is in the appendix. 
This conclusion is an intuitive one for two reasons. The first reason is a straightforward one: A higher 
stocking factor corresponds to a higher number of expected leftovers. Since there is a potential second 
opportunity to sell leftovers when recourse exists, leftovers have less of an "overage" cost associated 
with them in the two-period scenario than they do in the single-period scenario. The second reason 
requires more explanation, but briefly stated: A higher stocking factor increases the likelihood of 
learning about the uncertainty associated with demand. Since there is an opportunity to exploit learned 
information only when recourse exists, learning is more valuable in the two-period scenario than it is in 
the single-period scenario. 
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To explore more fully the meaning of learning in this context, consider the following comparison to a 
full-infonnation variant of the two-period decision problem with recourse. (In what follows, we hold Q 
constant to simplify the comparative analysis.) Suppose that it somehow were possible to observe the 
realized value of c1 regardless of whether or not leftovers occur in market I. Then, no matter what 
happens in market I, t = x1 and the distribution for Ez can be constructed from full information. 
Accordingly, the expected profit associated with market 2 (taken at the beginning of period I) would be: 
where the subscript "F' identifies this as the full-information case. Note that llp(Q It= X1 < z1) in (2I) 
is equivalent to ll(Q,z1 It= x1) in (2). Note also that llp(Q It= x1 <:: z1) in (2I) is independent of ZJ. 
This is because, with full information, the distribution for Ez is Fz(xlx1); and since x1 <:: ZJ. there are no 
leftovers available to transfer to market 2. Next, Theorem 6 establishes that, if Theorem 4 applies, then 
the optimal first-period stocking factor in the censored-information scenario is no less than the optimal 
first-period stocking factor in a comparable full-information scenario. The proof is in the appendix. 
THEOREM 6. Let ZJF* denote the optimal market I stocking factor in the full-information variant. If 
aFz(X It= ZJ)/azl s; 0, then ZJ* <:: ZJp*. 
· Thus, whereas Theorem 5 indicates thatinventory recourse (the opportunity to stock leftovers for 
possible sale in a subsequent period) results in a higher stocking factor than when no recourse exists, 
Theorem 6 indicates that information recourse (the opportunity to obtain information otherwise 
unavailable when leftovers occur) results in an even higher stocking factor. 
This can be explained as follows. When full information is guaranteed regardless of the operating 
decisions implemented, then information is free in the sense that no proactive measures are required for 
learning to occur. However, if full information is not guaranteed, then it must be "purchased." The 
"purchase price" of this information is a higher ZJ*· That is, when information is subject to censoring, a 
higher z1* represents a short-term cost because a higher z1* corresponds to a higher number of expected 
leftovers; but, in return, the higher z1* increases the opportunity to learn in the sense that it increases the 
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likelihood that information otherwise unobservable can be obtained (e.g., if z1 is increased to z,', then 
learning occurs if z1 ::; x1 < z1', where x1 denotes the realized value of e,). This phenomenon of 
"paying" for information through an increase in short-term leftovers is related to a similar phenomenon 
observed by Lariviere and Porteus (1999). They find that, for the case of a perishable product and an 
exponential underlying demand distribution (that is not price dependent), the optimal stocking quantity 
in a multi-period planning horizon with censored updating is greater than or equal to the optimal 
stocking quantity in a single-period horizon. 
It is extremely intuitive that information is valuable and hence, "learning" comes at a cost (e.g., higher 
short-term leftovers). However, by comparing a censored-information scenario to a full-information 
scenario, we find that the idea of learning in our context is based not so much .on what occurs (the 
revision of a distribution), but rather on how it occurs (through the use of censored information). 
Moreover, since Lemma 6(a) implies that dp, */dz, * = [1 - F, (ZJ *)]!2b, > 0, which implies that a higher 
z1 * results in a higher p1 *, we also find that a portion of the learning cost is passed on to the consumer 
when demand uncertainty is additive. 
6 CONCLUSION 
In this paper we developed a comprehensive approach for analyzing pricing and inventory decisions in a 
two-period retail setting when an opportunity to refine information about uncertain demand is available. 
One contribution of the analysis is the solution procedure: we show that all decisions (up to seven in all, 
including recourse decisions) can be determined uniquely if the first-period stocking factor is known. 
Hence, as for the most general single-period model considered by Petruzzi and Dada (1999a), the two-
period decision problem with recourse reduces to a search, albeit a more complex one, for one decision 
variable. A second contribution of the analysis is the policy implications: we find that the cost of 
learning is (1) a consequence of censored information because, on the margin, learning is free if full 
information is guaranteed; (2) measured in the form of a higher stocking factor; and (3) shared with the 
consumer in the form of a higher selling price when demand uncertainty is additive. A third 
contribution of the analysis is the application of the results to the motivating examples that highlight the 
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n a t u r a l  r o l e  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  g a t h e r e d  i n  o n e  m a r k e t  t o  e n h a n c e  d e c i s i o n  m a k i n g  i n  o t h e r  r e l a t e d  ) l l a r k e t s  
s e p a r a t e d  i n  t i m e  o r  s p a c e . ·  I n  t h e  r e m a i n d e r  o f  t h i s  s e c t i o n ,  w e  r e t u r n  t o  t h e s e  e x a m p l e s  t o  d e m o n s t r a t e  
t h e  s c o p e  o f  o u r  m o d e l .  
O u r  m o d e l  a p p l i e s  d i r e c t l y  t o  E x a m p l e  1 ,  t h u s  s o l v i n g  o p t i m a l l y  f o r  t h e  s t o c k i n g  a n d  p r i c i n g  d e c i s i o n s  
r e l e v a n t  t o  a  p r e v a l e n t  c a s e  i n  m a r k e t  r e s e a r c h ,  n a m e l y  t h e  c a s e  o f  u s i n g  a  s i n g l e  t e s t  m a r k e t  p r i o r  t o  a  
w i d e s p r e a d  l a u n c h  ( L i l i e n  e t  a ! . ,  1 9 9 2 ) .  H o w e v e r ,  m a r k e t  r e s e a r c h  i n v o l v i n g  m u l t i p l e  t e s t  m a r k e t s  m a y  
b e  m o r e  a p p r o p r i a t e  f o r  r e t a i l e r s  w h o  w i s h  t o  l e a r n  a b o u t  d e m a n d ,  d e p e n d i n g  o n  t h e  s i t u a t i o n .  B a s e d  i n  
p a r t  o n  t h a t  m o t i v a t i o n ,  F i s h e r  a n d  R a j a r a m  d e v e l o p e d  a  m o d e l  t o  e x p l o i t  ( I )  h i s t o r i c a l  p a t t e r n s  t o  s e l e c t  
a  s u b s e t  o f  m a r k e t s  a s  t e s t  m a r k e t s  a n d  ( 2 )  t e s t - m a r k e t - d e m a n d  i n f o r m a t i o n  t o  r e v i s e  f o r e c a s t s  f o r  t h e  
o v e r a l l  s e l l i n g  s e a s o n .  T h e i r  a n a l y s i s  i n t r o d u c e s  s o m e  o f  t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  t h a t  a r i s e  i n  e m p i r i c a l  s e t t i n g s ,  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  i f  c e n s o r i n g  i s  a n  i s s u e .  L a r i v i e r e  a n d  P o r t e u s  ( 1 9 9 9 )  a d d r e s s  c e n s o r i n g ,  b u t  t h e y  f o c u s  o n  
t h e  i m p o r t a n t  s p e c i a l  c a s e  o f  p e r i s h a b l e  i n v e n t o r y  a n d  p r e - d e t e r m i n e d  p r i c e s .  A n d ,  L i t t l e  (  1 9 6 6 ) ,  t o  
w h o m  t h e  n o t i o n  o f  u s i n g  m u l t i p l e  m a r k e t s  t o  c o l l e c t  g o o d  i n f o r m a t i o n  t o  b e  u s e d  o v e r  t i m e  c a n  b e  
t r a c e d ,  o p e r a t i o n a l i z e d  p r o m o t i o n  l e v e l  i n s t e a d  o f  s e l l i n g  p r i c e  a s  a  c o n t r o l  v a r i a b l e  a f f e c t i n g  d e m a n d .  
A s  t h e  a n a l y s e s  o f  F i s h e r  a n d  R a j a r a m ,  L a r i v i e r e  a n d  P o r t e u s ,  a n d  L i t t l e  s u g g e s t ,  t h e  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  
e x a c t  m a t h e m a t i c a l  m o d e l s  t o  m a r k e t  r e s e a r c h  p r o b l e m s  i n v o l v i n g  m u l t i p l e  t e s t  s i t e s  c a n  b e  q u i t e  
c h a l l e n g i n g .  O u r  r e s e a r c h  s u p p o r t s  t h i s .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  t h e  t W o - p e r i o d  d e c i s i o n  p r o b l e m  w i t h  r e c o u r s e  
s t u d i e d  i n  t h i s  p a p e r  c a n  b e  e x t e n d e d  i n  p r i n c i p l e  t o  s u p p l e m e n t  s u c h  w o r k .  T h i s  i s  b e c a u s e  t h e  r e c o u r s e  
a n a l y s i s  o f  S e c t i o n  3  w o u l d  c o n t i n u e  t o  a p p l y  e v e n  i f  m u l t i p l e  t e s t  m a r k e t s  w e r e  u s e d  i n  p e r i o d  1 .  T h e  
o n l y  t w o  a d j u s t m e n t s  t o  S e c t i o n  3  w o u l d  b e :  ( I )  t h e  r e a l i z e d  c a p a c i t y  c o n s t r a i n t  o f  t h e  s e c o n d - c h o i c e  
s u p p l i e r  w o u l d  d e p e n d  o n  t h e  s u m  o f  l e f t o v e r s  r e m a i n i n g  f r o m  t h e  f i r s t  p e r i o d ,  a n d  ( 2 )  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  
c o n s t r u c t e d  t o  c h a r a c t e r i z e  E
2  
w o u l d  d e p e n d  o n  t h e  v e c t o r  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  c o l l e c t e d  f r o m  t h e  f i r s t  p e r i o d .  
G e n e r a l l y  s p e a k i n g ,  t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  t e c h n i q u e  i n t r o d u c e d  i n  S e c t i o n  4  i s  n o  m o r e  d i f f i c u l t  c o n c e p t u a l l y  
w h e n  t  i s  a  v e c t o r  i n s t e a d  o f  a  s c a l a r .  M o r e o v e r ,  i t  c a n  b e  s h o w n  t h a t  t h e  p r o p e r t i e s  o f  T h e o r e m  2  a n d  3  
c o n t i n u e  t o  h o l d  w h e n  Z t  i s  a  v e c t o r  i n s t e a d  o f  a  s c a l a r .  A s  a  r e s u l t ,  t h e  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h i s  p a p e r  s t i l l  c o u l d  
b e  a p p l i e d  t o  r e d u c e  a  t w o - p e r i o d ,  m u l t i p l e - t e s t - s i t e  d e c i s i o n  p r o b l e m  w i t h  r e c o u r s e  t o  a  s e a r c h  f o r  f i r s t -
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period stocking factors, although finding an exact solution to the problem would be substantially more 
complex computationally because the search would be for an optimal decision vector. 
Our model also applies directly to Example 2, thus solving a fairly comprehensive generalization of a 
global newsvendor problem introduced by Kouvelis and Gutierrez (1997). In particular, our 
generalization incorporates (1) retail pricing, (2) learning from censored sales information, and (3) an 
option to pool purchasing resources. We find that a key to applying our model to this example is the 
transformation of foreign exchange risk into uncertainty surrounding the slope of the price-dependent 
demand function. This transformation is possible because we follow the lead of Kouvelis and Gutierrez 
and assume that the exchange rate is realized at the start of the recourse period. 
While our model also applies directly to the two-period version of Example 3, we find that a direct 
extension to longer horizons would be quite challenging. To understand why this is so, consider the role 
that the stocking factor plays in defining the statistic t. Uncertainty in demand in a given period 
determines not only how much stock is transferred, but also the nature of the information that is 
transferred (full vs. censored). These informational dynamics create the stumbling block: although the 
pricing decision for any given period could be localized once a (recourse) distribution is constructed, the 
construction of such a distribution would depend on the entire history oft's from earlier periods. 
This is in sharp contrast to a related model considered by Petruzzi and Dada (1998b). In that model, 
demand is not stochastic, although uncertainty exists because a parameter of the price-dependent 
demand curve is unknown to the decision maker. Once the unknown parameter is revealed, which 
occurs in a multi-period horizon the first time that leftovers occur, demand becomes deterministic. As a 
result, the entire history oft's is not required to construct the distribution to characterize a given 
period's e. Instead, only the most recent tis sufficient. This result leads to a backward-substitution 
algorithm that reduces all stocking and pricing decisions over the multi-period horizon to a single-
variable search. However, numerical experience with that model suggests that the effect of future 
periods on the current decisions diminish rapidly as the planning horizon grows. 
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Given this insight, one application for the two-period model analyzed in this paper is as a rolling-
horizon approximation to a multiple period setting. This approximation then could be improved with 
the addition of a suitable reward at the end of the second period to adjust for the impact of remaining 
periods that are dropped. It would be interesting to determine whether this reward could be chosen such 
that it provides bounds on the performance of the resulting optimal policy. Another promising avenue 
for extending the two-period analysis to longer horizons would be to reduce the complexity of the 
informational dynamics, for example, by finding a mechanism for obtaining full information. One way 
of obtaining such information would be to use an emergency supplier to fill all unmet demand at the end 
of each period (as in Eeckhoudt et al., 1995). 
APPENDIX: PROOFS 
LEMMA2. Let 11.2 (z 2 1 t) = J;2 F2 (x 2 1 t)dx 2 and suppose that Sz were given (which, from Lemma 1, 
implies given values for qh q12, and qz). Then, from (5) and (7): 
aR(pz,qi,q12,q2lt) Sz -ll.z(zzlt)-bz(pz +hz)Fz(zzlt) 
apz . 




So, for a given S2, R(Pz,q1,q12,q2 l t) is concave iii pz. Therefore, Pz* can be determined as the unique 
solution to the implicit function aR(p2,qJ,qJ2,q2 I t)/apz = 0, if a value of Sz is given: 
Notice, Pz* is written solely as a function of zz. Thus, from (7), we can also write: 
S ( I) b ( I) 11.2(z2 lt)+(a2 +b2h 2 +z2)F2(z2 1t) 2 z2 t = a 2 - 2P2 z2 t + z 2 = --''-'-"-'-..:..--'-"---"'-"--..=.!.-"-'-"-~ 
1+ F2 (z2 1 t) 
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LEMMA3. To prove this lemma, it suffices to show that aSz(z2it)tazz > 0. Thus, from Lemma 2(b): 
as2 (zzl t) 2Fz (zzlt) + (az + bzhz +zz )fz (zzl t) [Az (zzl t) + (az + bzhz +zz )Fz (zzlt)}z (z2it) 
az2 - l+Fz(Zzlt) [l+Fz(zzit)f 
_ 2F2(z21t)[l+Fz(z2it)]+(a2 +b2h2 +z2 -A2(z21t))f2(z21t) 
-
[1 + Fz (z2lt)f 
> 0 
The inequality follows because z2 - A2 (z2lt) = J~2 [1- F2 (xlt)}lx > 0. 
LEMMA 4. To prove this lemma, it suffices to show that M(z2lt) = ci + h2 (for j = 0, 12, 2) has a unique 
solution and that, at that solution, M(z2lt) is decreasing in zz. Thus, from (7) and the proof of Lemma 3: 
apz(Z2it) =-1 ( 1 aS2(zzlt))=-1 (l- 2F2(z2lt)+b2(P2(z2lt)+h2)f2(zzlt)J 
azz b2 az2 b2 1 + Fz (z2it) . 
1-F2(z21t) r (p )g ] 
= r . ]ll-b2 2(z2it)+h2 2(z21t) b2 1+F2(z21t) · 
where gz(zzlt) = fz(zzlt)/[1 - Fz(zzit)]. Therefore: 
= [1- F2 (z I t)l b: ~ :~~~~~:~t)] ( 1 + F2~z2lt) )(p2 (z2lt)+ h2 )g2 (z2lt)] 





-2 [r I )f · agz Cz2lt)] r I ] ,I- Fz (z2 t) 2 (z21t) + b2M(z2it) a b2tl+F2(z2 t) z2 0 . 
-1 [2(1 F ( I ))2 ( I) (1-F2(zzlt))2 ag2(z21t)] 
= r ] - 2 z2 t · g 2 z2 t + . 
b2l1 + Fz (z21t) g2 (z21t) az2 
-[1-F2(z21t)f [ag2Cz2lt) 2 ( I )2] 0 r L + g2 z2 t < 
b2tl+F2(z2it)jg2(z2it) az 
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This inequality implies that M(z2lt) has no local minimum and, at most, one local maximum. In 
addition, from Lemma 2(a): pz(Oit) = a:zfbz and pz(z-7oo It) < oo. Th?s, for j = 0, 12, and 2, M(Oit) = 
a:zfbz + hz > Cz + hz;?; Cj + hz and M(z-7oo I t) = 0 < Cj + hz. Therefore, for j = 0, 12, and 2: M(zziO = Cj + 
hz has exactly one solution and, at that solution, M(zzlt) is decreasing in z. 
LEMMA 5. We consider three cases separately. 
Case I: Assume Sz(zzlt) < 0 
In this case, from Lemma 1: qi(zzlt) = Sz(zzlt) and q!2(zzlt) = qz{zzlt) = 0. Thus, from Lemma 3, the 
supply constraint qi(zzlt) :'> Q implies the constraint zz :'> ZQ and therefore, the optimization problem (10) 
can be written as follows: 
(A1) 
s.t. z2 ::; zQ 
Consider, from Lemma 2 and the definition of M(zzlt) given in Lemma 4: 
<JR ~ (z2lt) = (p2 (z21t)- c 0 )as~ (z2lt) (p2 (z21t) + h2 )F2 (z2lt) + [s2 (z2lt)- A2 (z21t)]<Jp2(z2lt) 
z2 · z2 <Jz 2 
- 2 z2 t -co 2 (zz t) + h2 r2 (z2 t) 1- b2 ~vp:..=:...;'-=-'-- (p ( I ) )<JS2 (z2lt) (p I n:, I [ ::l.-.2 (z21t)J ~2 ~2 
= [M(zzlt)- (co+ h2)]dSz (zzlt) 
<Jz2 
From the proof of Lemma 3, dSz(zzlt)ldzz > 0. Therefore, a necessary condition for z2 to be an interior 
maximum of RI(zzJt) is M(zzlt) = co + hz. But, given Lemma 4, this condition is sufficient because 
M(zzJt) =co+ hz has exactly one solution, and this solution indeed corresponds to the unconstrained 
maximum of RI(zzJt). Thus, given that ZI is the unique solution to M(zzJt) =co+ hz, <JR1(z2Jt)/dzz> 0 if 
and only if Zz < ZJ. This implies that the solution to (A1) is min { ZI,ZQ}. 
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Case II: Assume 0 < S,fz,ltl < 0 + L1 
In this case, from Lemma 1: qJ(zzlt) = Q, q!2(zzl0 = Sz(zzit)- Q, and qz(zzlt) = 0. Thus, from the 
corollary to Lemma 1, the supply constraint qn(zzlt) 5 L1 implies the constraint zz 5 ZQ+L and therefore, 
the optimization problem (10) can be written as follows: 
S.t. Zz 5 ZQ+L 
Given Q, the structure of this problem is analogous to the structure of (AI). Thus, by analogy, the 
solution to this problem is min { zn,ZQ+d, where zu is the unique solution to M(z2lt) = c12 + h2. 
Case III: Assume 0 + L1 < S,Cz2!t) 
In this case, Lemma 1: q1(z2lt) = Q, q!2(zzlt) = Lh and q2Cz2lt) = Sz(z2lt)- Q- L1. Thus, the 
optimization problem (1 0) can be written as follows: 
Given Q and Lh this problem also is analogous to (AI), except there is no supply constraint. Therefore, 
by analogy, the solution to this problem is zm, where zm is the unique solution to M(zzlt) = c2 + h2. 
THEOREM2. PART (a). Given z1 and xh the realized value of Eh there are two cases: t = x1 ifx1 is 
observable and t = z1 if x1 is not observable. The details of the proof are analogous for both cases; thus, 
we provide them only for the case in which t = XJ. 
First notice, from the definition of ZQ (Theorem 1, 2"d step) and from Lemma 3: 
dZQ =[dSz(Zzlt=~1) l-1 >0 
dQ dZz Zz=ZQ 
Likewise, since t = x1 implies that L1 = z1 - x1: 
dzQ+z1-x1 =[aS2(z2 1t=x1) ]-
1 
>O 
dQ dZz z2=ZJ-XJ 
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Thus, for a given z~, as Q increases, both ZQ and ZQ+zi-•I increase. However, ZJ, zu, and zm all are 
independent of Q. ·As a result, (12) implies that as Q increases, IT(Q,ziit =XI) progresses from 
Rm(zmlxi) to Rn(2:t~+zi-•IIxi) to Ru(znlxi) to RI(zdxi) to RJ(ZJixi). Therefore, it is a straightforward, 
though tedious, exercise to show that IT(Q,z1lt = x,) is continuous in Q. 
Next, consider, from Lemma 5 and Theorem 1: 
ilRm(zm I xi) 
. ilQ =c2 -co 
ilRn(ZQ+z,-x,l xl) 
ilQ = M(zQ+z,-x, It= x 1)- (c0 + h 2) 
ilR 11 (zn I x1) 
ilQ. =cl2 -co 
ilR 1(zQ I x1) 
ilQ =M(zQ It =x1)-(c0 +h 2) 
ilRI(Z] I X]) 0 
ilQ 
·As ZQ+z1-x1 -7 zm from above, ilRn(ZQ+z1-x1lx,)/ilQ -7 M(zmlt = x,)- (co+ hz) = Cz- co= ilRm(zmlx,)lilQ. 
This implies that iliT(Q,z1lt = x1)/ilQ is continuous at the value of Q that is such that ZQ+zi-•I = Zm. 
Similarly, as ZQ+z1-xi -7 Zn from below, ilRn(ZQ+zi·x1lx,)/ilQ -7 ilRn(zulxi)/ilQ; as ZQ -7 zn from above, 
ilRJ(ZQIXI)/ilQ -7 ilRn(znlx,)/ilQ; and as ZQ -7 ZJ from below, ilRu(zdx,)/ilQ -7 ilRI(ZIIx,)/ilQ. Therefore, 
IT(Q,ziit =XI) is differentiable for all Q. 
Note also, from the proof of Lemma 4, that although M(zzlt = XJ) may first increase for small values of 
Zz, the equation M(zzlt) = c2 + h2 has exactly one solution. Consequently, M(zzlt = x 1) must begin its 
descent in zz at a value of zz that is less than zm. Moreover, once M(zzlt =.XI) begins decreasing ill Zz, it 
remains decreasing in Zz, which implies that M(zzlt = x1) is decreasing for all Zz 2: zm. 
We now can piece together the shape of I1(Q,z1lt = x1). As Q increases from 0 to the critical value at 
which ZQ+z1-x1 = Zm, I1(Q,z1lt =XI) increases linearly at a rate of Cz- eo. Then, as Q increases from the 
critical value at which ZQ+z,-x1 = zm to the critical value at which ZQ+zi·•J = zn, the rate of change of 
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Il(Q,ziif= XI) is M(ZQ+z1.x1lt =XI)- (co+ hz). But since (1) ZQ+z1-x1;:: zm, (2) M(zzlt .=XI) is decreasing 
in zz for zz;:: zm, and (3) dZQ+z1-x/dQ > 0, the rate of change of Il(Q,ziit =XI) decreases from M(zmlt = 
XI)- (co+ hz) = cz- co to M(znlt =XI)- (co+ hz) = c12- co as Q increases such that ZQ+z1.x1 increases 
from zm to zn. In other words, in this region, Il(Q,ziit =XI) continues to increase as a function of Q, but . 
at a decreasing rate. Next, for Q that is such that ZQ+z1.,1 > Zn, but ZQ < zn, IT(Q,ziJt = x1) increases 
linearly at a rate of c12 - co as Q increases. Then, as Q increases from the critical value at which ZQ = zn 
to the critical value at which ZQ = z~, Il(Q,zlit = XJ) continues to increase, but again it increases at a 
decreasing rate until the rate equals 0. From then on, for all Q that is such that ZQ >z~, IT(Q,z1jt = x1) 
remains constant. In summary:, IT(Q,ziit =XI) is non-decreasing and concave in Q for the case t = x1. 
The details are analogous for the case t = z1; hence, IT(Q,zllt = z1) also is continuous, differentiable, non-
decreasing, and concave in Q. Thus, from (2): E[IT(Q,zi)], the unconditional optimal expected profit of 
the recourse problem, is a convex combination of functions that are continuous, differentiable, non-
decreasing, and concave in Q. Therefore E[IT(Q,zi)] possesses those same properties. 
PART (b). Given Q, we again consider two cases: t =XI and t = z1. Unlike in PART (a), however, we 
approach each case differently, applying an algebraic analysis to the case t = x 1 and a probabilistic 
analysis to the case t = z1. 
Ift = Xh then L1 = z1- XI> 0, but Fz(xjt = x1) is independent of ZJ. Thus, from Theorem 1, ZQ+z,-x, is 
increasing in ZJ, but z~, zn, zm, and ZQ all are independent of ZJ. As a result, the form of IT(Q,z1jt =XI) 
depends on the specific value of Q that is given. In particular, from (12): 
• If the given value of Q is such that ZQ;:: z~, then Il(Q,ziJt = x1) = RI(ZijXJ) for all Z1 > x1; thus, 
from Lemma 5, Il(Q,ziit =XI) is independent of ZI-
• If the given value of Q is such that ZI > ZQ > zu, then Il(Q,ziit =XI)= ~J(ZQIXI) for all ZJ > x1; 
thus, from Lemma 5, Il(Q,ziit =XI) is independent of ZJ. 
• If the given value of Q is such that Zn <:: ZQ > zm, then IT(Q,ziJt =XI) = Rn(ZQ+z,-x,lxi) for values 
of Z1 that are greater than XJ, but less than the critical value of Z1 at which ZQ+z,-x, = zu; and 
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IT(Q,zi!t =XI)= Rn(znlxi) for values of ZI that are greater than or equal to the critical value of 
ZI at which ZQ+z.-x, = Zn. Thus, IT(Q,zi!t =XI) is continuous. Moreover, from Lemmas 5 and 4, 
ClRn(ZQ+z1-x1lxi)/Clzi = M(ZQ+z,-x,lt =XI)- (Ciz + hz) :2: 0; and Rn(znlxi) is independent of ZI. 
Thus, IT(Q,zi!t =XI) also is differentiable and non-decreasing in ZI. 
• If the given value of Q is such that Zlll <: ZQ, then IT(Q,zi!t =XI) = Rlll(Zilllxi) for values of ZI 
that are greater than XI. but less than or equal to the critical value of ZI at which ZQ+z,-x, = zlll; 
IT(Q,zi!t =XI) = Rn(ZQ+z.-x,!xi) for values of ZI that are greater than the critical value of ZI at 
which ZQ+z,-x, = Zlll, but less than the critical value of ZI at which ZQ+z,-x, = zu; and IT(Q,ziit = 
XI) = Rn(znlxi) for values of ZI that are greater than or equal to the critical value of ZI at which 
ZQ+z,-x, = zn. Thus, IT(Q,ziit =XI) is continuous. Moreover, from Lemmas 5 and 4, 
ClRm(zm!xi)/Clzi = (cz- Ciz); ClRn(ZQ+z.-x1IXI)/Clzi = M(ZQ+z,-x,lt =XI)- (Ciz + hz); and Rn(znlxi) is 
independent of ZI. Thus, IT(Q,zi!t =XI) also is differentiable and non-decreasing in ZI. 
In summary: IT(Q,zi!t =XI) is non-decreasing in ZI for any given Q. 
If t = ZJ, then Fz(xlt = ZI) is non-increasing in ZI by assumption, but LI = 0 is independent of ZI. This 
implies that the expected recourse profit, conditioned on the event that t = ZJ, depends on ZI only 
through the distribution function used to characterize !:'z. Thus, for the purpose of this proof, let Eziz1 
denote the random variable associated with market 2 demand when F2(xlt = ZI) is the distribution 
function used to characterize that random variable. Then, from (5), notice that for any given decision 
vector (pz, qh qiz, qz), the expected profit associated with the recourse problem can be written as 
· R(pz,qhqiz,qzlt = ZI) = E['l'(Ezjz1)], where'¥( Ezjz1) = pz(qi+q12+qz)- (pz+hz)max{ (zz- Ezjz1),0}-
(coqi+cl2qiz+czqz). Notice that 'I'(Ezjz1) is a non-decreasing function of Ezjz1• 
Now, consider two arbitrary values of ZJ, say ZIA and ZJB. Without loss of generality, let ZIB > ZIA· 
Since ClF(xjt = ZI)/Clzi ::; 0, F(xjt = ZIB)::; F(xjt = ZIA). Thus, by definition, Zm is larger than ZIA in the 
usual stochastic ordering, which implies that E['I'(Ez~z18)] <: E['l'(Ezjz,A)] (Buzacott and Shanthikurnar, 
1993). Therefore, if we define v = (p2,qhqiz,qz) as any decision vector for the recourse problem, then 
R(v!ziB) = E['I'(Ezjz18)] <: E['I'(Ezjz1A)] = R(vjziA). In addition, if we define vj* as the optimal decision 
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vector for the recourse problem when Ezjz1; is the random variable associated with market 2 demand (j = 
A, B), then, by the definition of Vs*, IT(Q,zlslt = ZJB) = R(va*lziB) <: R(vA *lzJB). Therefore, IT(Q,ziBit = 
Z!B) = R(vs*IZ!B);:: R(VA *lz!B);:: R(vA *IZ!A) = IT(Q,Z!Ait = Z!A). In summary: if aF(xlt = Z!)!OZ! s; 0, 
then IT(Q,z1lt = z1) is non-decreasing in Z1 for any given Q. 
Since, for a given Q, both IT(Q,z1lt = x1) and IT(Q,z1lt = ZJ) are non-decreasing in ZJ. (2) implies: 
THEOREM 3. First condition on the event 132 = b2 and solve the conditional recourse problem as per 
Theorem 1. As a consequence, if tlz = bz and t = min{zhxd, where x1 denotes the realized value of e1 
(whether observable or not), then a conditional expected optimal profit can be computed as a function of 
Q and z1: IT(Q,zi It= min{xhzd; tlz = bz). Notice, IT(Q,ZI It= min{x~>zd; tlz = bz) is exactly the same 
as IT(Q,z1 I t) from Section 3. Since j32 and e1 are independent, we can un-condition on t by integrating 
over x1 and thereby compute E[IT(Q,zi ltlz = bz)], which is exactly the same as E[IT(Q,z1)] from Section 
3. Theorem 2 therefore implies that E[IT(Q,z1 1132 = bz)] is non-decreasing and concave in Q for a given 
ZJ, and non-decreasing in z1 for a given Q (assuming that aFz(x I t = zi)/az1 s; 0). Next, we can integrate 
over b2 and thereby compute E[IT(Q,ZJ)], the unconditional expected profit. And, since E[IT(Q,z1)] is a 
convex combination of functions that are {1) non-decreasing and concave in Q for a given ZJ. and (2) 
non-decreasing in z1 for a given Q, the results of the theorem follow. 
THEOREM 4. If <I>(xl9) = 1- e·en(x) and ho{9) = [j3a/I'(a)]9a·Ie·~, then F1(x) = 1 - [j3/(j3+n(x))]a and: 
hl(9lt=Xl)= ljl(xll9)ho(9) = fl3+n(Xl)r+l 9"e-Bfll+n(Xt)J 
fl(xl) r(a+1) 
Thus: 
[1-<I>(z1 19)}10 (9) 
1-F1(z1) 





f3+ n(x1) + n(x) 
a.n'(x) 
Therefore, given that a.;;:: Yz and that n"(x) "'d2n(x)/dx2 ;;:: 0: 
og2<xlt=x1) 2 < I )2 ca.+I)n"(x) (2a.+I} < I )2 0 · -="-"---:'---'-'-+ g 2 X t = x 1 = + -- 2 X t = x 1 > ox f3+n(x 1)+n(x) a.+l 
og2(xlt=zl) 2 ( I )2 a.n"(x) (2a.-l) ( I )2 0 -="-'-:o-~"-+ g 2 x t = z1 = + - g2 x t = z1 > ox f3+n(z1)+n(x) a.+l 
and: 
LEMMA 6. PARTS (a) and (b). Given (18), Np(p~oz1) is the expected profit function of a single-period 
newsvendor problem with pricing. From Petruzzi and Dada (1999a), then, Np(PJ.ZJ) is concave in p1; 
thus, P1*lzl can be determined as the unique solution to oNp(p~ozJ)/opl = 0: 
PART (c). From Theorem 2(a), E[IT(Q,z1)] is concave in Q for a given z1. Thus, from (19), NQ(Q,z1) is 
concave in Q. Moreover, from the proof of Theorem 2, for arbitrarily large values of Q, oE[IT(Q,z1)]/oQ 
= 0, which implies that oNQ(Q,zl)/oQ =- c < 0. Therefore, given Z~o either Q*lz1 = 0 (boundary-point 
maximum) or Q*lz1 satisfies oNQ(Q,z1)/oQ = 0 (interior-point maximum). 
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THEOREM 5. Assume that ilFz(xJz,)/ilz, ::;; 0. From (19): 
dNQ(Q(z1),z1) CJNQ(Q(z1),z1) ilNQ(Q(z1),z1)dQ(z1) ilNQ(QCz1),z1) . --"---~ = + · = ~ 0 (A2) 
dz1 ilz1 ilQ(z1) dz1 ilz1 
. In (A2), [ilNQ(Q(z1),z1)/ilQ(z1)][dQ(z,)/dz,] = 0 by complementary slackness: if Q(z1) is an interior~ 
point maximum of NQ(Q,z1), then [ilNQ(Q(z,),z,)/ilQ(z,)] = 0 by definition; if Q(z1) is a boundary-point 
solution, then dQ(z1)/dz1 = 0. And, ilNQ(Q(z,),z,)!ilz, = CJE[I1(Q(z,),z1)]/ilz1 ~ 0 because ilFz(xJz1)/ilz1 ::;; 
0 implies, by Theorem 2(b), that ilE[Il(Q(z,),z,)]/ilz, ~ 0. 
Therefore, we have: (a) Zsp is the value of z, that maximizes Np(p,(z1),z,), by the definition ofz,p; (b) 
z,* is the value of z1 that maximizes Np(p1(z,),z,) + NQ(Q,(z,),z,), by the definition of z1*; and (c) 
NQ(Q(z1),z1) is non-decreasing in z" by (A2). These three points imply that z, *;:: Zsp· 
THEOREM 6. Assume that ilF2(xJzl)/ilz,::;; 0. From (21): 
But, from (2): 
The inequality follows because ilii(Q,z, J t = z,)lilz, ~ 0, from the proof of Theorem 2(b). Thus: 
iJE[I1(Q,z1)) ~ ilE[IIF(Q,zJ)) 
OZJ OZJ 
which implies that z1* ~ z1p*, where z,F* denotes the optimal market 1 stqcking factor in the full-
information variant. 
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